It has been some time since the strategic importance of India to Japan began to be emphasised. This is set against a backdrop of growing perceptions of China as a threat. In 2005, amidst the outbreak of “anti-Japanese riots” across China, then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited India—the first such visit by a Japanese prime minister in five years—and declared that he would give a “strategic direction” to the Japan–India Global Partnership. Since then, a system of annual reciprocal visits by leaders has been established between Japan and India.

However, looking back over the past 20 years, the results of substantive cooperation between Japan and India have fallen short of expectations, given the level of political and diplomatic enthusiasm. Even 10 years after the conclusion of the Japan–India Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, not a single item of Japanese defence equipment has been delivered to India—as evidenced by the stalling of the plan to transfer Japan’s US-2 amphibious aircraft—and the opening of the Mumbai–Ahmedabad high-speed rail project has been significantly delayed compared to the original schedule. Furthermore, despite the Modi administration’s “Make in India” initiative, the number of Japanese companies entering the Indian market has stagnated. Trade volume between Japan and India, as well as the number of Japanese residents there, remains at around one-tenth that of Japan–China relations. In contrast to the Japan–China relationship, which is often described as “politically cold, economically warm”, Japan–India relations are politically cordial but remain economically distant; in this sense, it would be more appropriate to describe them as “politically warm, economically cold”.