In a recent Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) Issue Brief titled Strengthening the Nested Geometry of RIC–SCO–BRICS, Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh (Research Fellow, MP-IDSA) examines the strategic rationale for strengthening the interconnected relationship between the Russia-India-China (RIC) framework, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Singh argues that India’s robust engagement with these three overlapping non-Western groupings is rooted in three enduring principles of its foreign policy: strategic autonomy, systemic balancing, and leadership of the Global South. Against the backdrop of improving India-China relations, India’s 2026 BRICS Presidency, and growing uncertainty in the international order, the author contends that revitalising the RIC mechanism would reinforce the broader “nested geometry” of RIC, SCO, and BRICS and advance India’s long-term strategic interests.

The brief argues that India’s geopolitical position requires sustained engagement across both the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific regions. According to Singh, strategic autonomy remains a “foundational value” of Indian foreign policy, allowing India to preserve its freedom of decision-making through multi-alignment while avoiding excessive dependence on any single power. The author further argues that India seeks “systemic security rather than narrowly defined security groupings”, participating simultaneously in institutions such as the SCO and the Quad to balance against strategic coercion rather than promote it. The third pillar of India’s foreign policy is its commitment to the Global South, which Singh describes as “an emotion” rooted in a shared history of colonialism. India, he argues, seeks to advance the interests of developing countries through reformed multilateralism, technological cooperation, and sustainable development.

A central theme of the brief is the concept of the “nested geometry” of RIC, SCO, and BRICS. Singh argues that although the three institutions are not formally nested, they possess a “natural close connection” through overlapping membership, complementary agendas, and shared strategic objectives. RIC emerged as a consultative mechanism among Russia, India, and China to respond to post-Cold War unipolarity; BRICS evolved into a platform for economic cooperation and global governance reform; and the SCO developed from a regional security organisation into a broader institution encompassing economic and developmental cooperation. Together, the three groupings promote multipolarity, strengthen cooperation among major non-Western powers, and provide important platforms for advancing the interests of the Global South.

The brief devotes considerable attention to the historical evolution and growing significance of these institutions. Singh traces the origins of RIC to the trilateral foreign ministers’ meetings launched in 2002 and notes that the mechanism became dormant after 2021 because of deteriorating India-China relations and the geopolitical consequences of the war in Ukraine. He argues that recent statements from Russia and China expressing support for renewed trilateral cooperation, improvements in India-China ties, and India’s BRICS Presidency create favourable conditions for reviving the framework. At the same time, BRICS has expanded significantly in both membership and influence, while the SCO continues to play an increasingly important role in regional security, counterterrorism, trade, connectivity, and economic cooperation across Eurasia.

Another major focus of the brief is India’s strategic interest in revitalising RIC despite persistent tensions with China and Pakistan. Singh argues that reducing India’s participation in Eurasian institutions because of bilateral disputes should not become the norm, particularly to accommodate Western strategic preferences. Instead, India should maintain uninterrupted strategic communication with both Russia and China while protecting its own national interests. Given Eurasia’s importance for regional security, energy supplies, and connectivity initiatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) pipeline, sustained trilateral dialogue would strengthen India’s geopolitical position. The author therefore recommends institutionalising the RIC process through regular national security adviser and senior officials’ meetings, with the eventual objective of restoring summit-level engagements. The brief concludes that India’s engagement with RIC, SCO, and BRICS should be viewed as complementary to its wider foreign policy rather than as alternatives to its Indo-Pacific partnerships. Singh argues that strategic autonomy is “not about ad hoc transactionalism” but rests upon stable and durable pillars of multi-alignment. With India’s BRICS Presidency, improving India-China relations, and growing uncertainty surrounding the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific, he contends that New Delhi should move beyond “emotional” partnerships, “framing traps”, and “simplistic binaries” by maintaining sustained engagement across both the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific theatres. Revitalising the RIC mechanism, he concludes, would strengthen the broader nested geometry of RIC, SCO, and BRICS