Atlantic Council report (June 2026), Beyond the Corridor: IMEC as a Network of Routes, by Afaq Hussain and Maisoon H. Kafafy, examines how the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) could evolve from a single route into a wider network of interconnected trade corridors. The authors argue that disruptions to the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz have exposed the vulnerability of relying on individual maritime chokepoints. They therefore propose expanding IMEC through Oman, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria via Jordan, creating multiple entry, transit, and Mediterranean exit points. The expanded network, they estimate, could support up to $331 billion in annual non-oil trade and provide an alternative route for around 60 percent of container traffic normally passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
India is central to the report’s conception of the corridor. It recalls that IMEC was launched at the September 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi by India, the United States, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, France, Germany and Italy, with the original concept connecting India’s western ports to Europe through the Gulf and Levant. The report describes the corridor as a multimodal system combining maritime shipping, rail, road, fibre-optic cables and energy pipelines.
The report’s timeline highlights several developments involving India since 2023. These include the Greece-India summit in February 2024, the India-UAE virtual trade corridor announced in September 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2025 engagement in Marseille, the first meeting of European IMEC envoys hosted by India in August 2025, and the India-EU free trade agreement concluded in January 2026. The report presents the latter as providing an important trade-policy foundation for IMEC cargo. It also notes the February 2026 memorandum between Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone and Marseille Fos, through which an IMEC Ports Club was proposed, followed by the March 2026 IMEC forum in Trieste.
Oman is presented as particularly relevant to India because its ports sit outside both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab. Sohar, Salalah and Duqm could therefore provide additional gateways for Indian and wider Asian trade. The report notes that India-Oman bilateral trade reached $10.6 billion in FY 2024-25 and argues that the India-Oman Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement further integrates Omani ports into Asian supply chains. Hafeet Rail, linking Sohar to the UAE’s Etihad Rail network, is identified as a crucial missing link for connecting this maritime gateway to the wider IMEC system.
Saudi Arabia remains the structural backbone of the network. Under the expanded model, Indian cargo could enter the Gulf, move across Saudi Arabia and reach Red Sea gateways such as Jeddah and Neom before proceeding towards Egypt or other Mediterranean exits. The report identifies the proposed Saudi Landbridge as particularly important because it could connect the Gulf’s eastern railway system with Jeddah and the Red Sea, creating a continuous land route linking the Arabian Gulf with western Saudi Arabia.
Egypt provides another route for Indian trade towards Europe. Cargo could move from Saudi Red Sea ports to Ain Sokhna and then across Egypt’s emerging rail network to Mediterranean ports including Port Said, Alexandria, El Dekheila, Abu Qir and Damietta. The report views this as a way to create a Red Sea-to-Mediterranean connection using existing and developing Egyptian infrastructure. India is also included in the report’s trade calculations, with India-Egypt bilateral trade listed at approximately $3.8 billion.
The Jordan-Syria extension would provide a further Mediterranean outlet. Jordan would link Saudi Arabia’s network to Syria through the Al-Haditha and Nasib-Jaber crossings, while Syria’s M5 highway and developing rail links could connect Damascus to Tartus and Latakia. The report regards this as the most difficult of the proposed extensions because infrastructure reconstruction, political stabilisation and regulatory reform remain necessary.
The report’s trade calculations provide a clearer indication of India’s economic stake. The estimated $331 billion potential trade pool includes India-Europe and India-West Asia flows. Examples cited include India-Germany trade of $26.69 billion, India-Switzerland at $20.02 billion, India-Italy at $14.04 billion, India-Israel at $4.35 billion, India-Egypt at $3.80 billion and India-Jordan at $2.73 billion. The authors stress that the $331 billion figure represents potential trade that could use the network, rather than a forecast of how much IMEC will actually capture. They also exclude direct maritime India-UAE, India-Saudi Arabia and India-Oman trade from the calculation because those flows do not use the corridor’s overland component.
Indian private-sector participation also features in the report. The Adani Ports-Marseille Fos agreement is cited as evidence of commercial interest in developing links between Indian and European gateways. The authors argue more broadly that private-sector participation will be necessary to translate IMEC from an infrastructure concept into an operational freight network.
The report’s central argument remains that IMEC should no longer be understood as one linear corridor. Instead, it should become a network linking India’s western ports and Indian Ocean trade with multiple Gulf gateways, Saudi land routes, Egyptian and Levantine Mediterranean exits, and European ports. Such a structure would allow cargo to be rerouted when particular chokepoints or political corridors become unavailable, while increasing capacity and competition among logistics providers.
The authors therefore recommend changes to IMEC’s governance and membership structure, including a network secretariat, harmonised transit rules, coordinated infrastructure planning and investment in critical railway links. They propose that Oman, Egypt and Jordan seek formal IMEC network participant status, while Syria could initially participate as an observer once political and reconstruction conditions permit.
Overall, the report’s argument for India is that IMEC’s value lies not simply in providing one alternative route to Europe, but in creating a diversified regional connectivity architecture. A network of routes would give Indian trade greater resilience against disruptions around Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab and other regional chokepoints, while simultaneously expanding India’s economic connectivity with Oman, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Europe.
