In its April 2026 Discussion Document, “Starlink and Risks for India”, Ashwin Prasad Rao, Aditya Ramanathan, and Col. Das (Retd.) of the Takshashila Institution examine the security and regulatory risks posed by Starlink in India. The paper argues that India’s existing regulatory framework cannot fully address the risks arising from SpaceX’s operational control over its satellite constellation. Starlink could deny connectivity when India needs it or maintain services when the government wants them shut down. The authors recommend reducing dependence on foreign satellite providers, expanding domestic broadband, and regulating direct-to-device satellite technology.
Starlink’s technological lead and Elon Musk’s influence in the United States government underpin the authors’ concerns. With more than 10,000 active satellites in low Earth orbit, Starlink offers high-bandwidth, low-latency connectivity and remains ahead of competing networks. The paper argues that Musk’s influence and SpaceX’s role in American defence and space programmes could give the company geopolitical leverage over India. It also raises concerns about data privacy following Starlink’s January 2026 policy update, which permits customer data, including location information, IP addresses, and certain communications information, to be used for artificial intelligence training and shared with third parties by default.
The authors draw on Ukraine and Iran to illustrate the risks of relying on Starlink. In Ukraine, Musk’s reported restrictions on access, including near Crimea, demonstrated how a private company’s decisions could affect military operations. In Iran, Starlink enabled users to bypass internet shutdowns, while government attempts to disrupt the service through jamming and terminal seizures had limited success. These cases highlight both the difficulty of blocking Starlink and the influence SpaceX retains over its availability.
India has faced related challenges. In December 2024, security forces recovered Starlink equipment from a militant group in Manipur, about two weeks after authorities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands found smugglers using the devices. In the latter case, Starlink declined an Indian government request for user details and usage history, directing authorities to United States law enforcement or international procedures. The authors argue that these incidents expose the limits of relying on a foreign operator to meet India’s security requirements.
The paper examines the additional security conditions imposed on Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) licensees by the Department of Telecommunications in May 2025. These require operators to route Indian user traffic through domestic gateways, provide monitoring facilities to security agencies, and comply with directions to restrict services during hostilities or as directed by law enforcement. In January 2026, the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) rejected Starlink’s application for its second-generation constellation, which incorporates direct-to-device technology that allows satellites to connect directly to mobile phones.
However, the authors argue that these regulations cannot resolve the central problem: operational control remains with SpaceX. Indian authorities cannot independently verify all data routing within the satellite constellation, while some requirements rely on operator undertakings and self-certification. Direct-to-device technology could further weaken oversight by bypassing the domestic gateways on which the current framework depends. India cannot compel Starlink to maintain connectivity during a crisis or guarantee that it will suspend services when directed.
The authors recommend expanding the Digital Bharat Nidhi fund to improve broadband access in underserved areas and reduce demand for expensive satellite internet. India should prioritise providers that offer greater scope for domestic oversight through joint ventures, Indian equity participation, or stronger bilateral enforcement arrangements. Starlink could continue to serve selected purposes, such as disaster relief, but India should diversify providers and discourage widespread retail dependence on foreign satellite networks. The paper also calls for a regulatory framework for direct-to-device services and the operationalisation of the proposed National SATCOM Monitoring Facility.
Overall, the paper argues that India must reduce its dependence on foreign satellite operators rather than rely on regulation alone. The study remains relevant amid Elon Musk’s recent posts on X, which have brought renewed focus to the security and regulatory risks associated with Starlink’s operations in India. The study highlights the limits of regulation alone and the need for India to retain greater control over its satellite communications infrastructure
