In India and Europe: Bridging Continents Through IMEC, edited by Constantino Xavier and Abhishek Agarwal and published by the Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP) in 2026, contributors examine what is required to turn the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) from a political commitment into an operating economic network. The report argues that IMEC should be pursued not as “a mere transport corridor but as a resilient economic network”, whose value will depend on the integration of transport, energy, digital infrastructure, investment, and regulatory systems. Since its announcement at the 2023 Group of Twenty (G20) Summit in New Delhi, IMEC has attracted political support from India, Europe, and Gulf partners. Yet the main cross-border rail links, financing arrangements, and institutional machinery needed to make it work remain unsettled.
The war in Ukraine, the conflict in Gaza, attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis have exposed the vulnerability of trade and energy flows concentrated around a few maritime passages. These disruptions have also changed how India and Europe view connectivity, bringing route diversification and supply-chain resilience closer to the centre of their economic security agendas. Negotiations on the India–European Union (EU) Free Trade Agreement (FTA) concluded in January 2026, alongside the signing of a Security and Defence Partnership. The FTA could strengthen the corridor’s commercial foundation once legal revision, signature, approval, and ratification are complete. The report nevertheless distinguishes progress in bilateral relations from the development of IMEC itself: such developments “do not by themselves create a functioning corridor”.
In “Taking IMEC Places”, Constantino Xavier argues that the initiative should extend beyond the countries directly located along its proposed route. He envisages an “Indo-Atlantic connectivity partnership” linking the Indian and Atlantic oceans and bringing four adjoining regions into the discussion: Southeast Asia, the North Atlantic, Central Asia and the Caucasus, and North and East Africa. The intention is to prevent IMEC from becoming “a mere point-to-point, bilateral exercise”. Xavier calls for India and Europe to ensure that the corridor also brings development benefits to landlocked Central Asian economies and to countries in Africa’s Mediterranean and Horn regions. He also cautions against presenting IMEC as a replacement for the Suez Canal. Its purpose should be to foster “cooperative complementarities” with existing routes and create additional choices.
Nicolas Blarel examines the security implications, arguing that the 2026 Hormuz crisis has moved maritime cooperation closer to the centre of EU–India relations. India is exposed through its energy imports, merchant shipping, and seafarers, while for both India and the EU the crisis is “not only geopolitical but existential”. New Delhi’s working relations with Iran, Gulf monarchies, and Western governments give it diplomatic access, albeit limited, across competing camps. But India’s commitment to strategic autonomy “limits its participation in formal security alliances or coercive military operations”, and its threat perceptions do not always match those of the EU. Blarel therefore cautions against expecting India to act as a substitute security provider or mediator in Gulf disputes. He proposes practical cooperation on shipping protection, port resilience, maritime awareness, and undersea cables. An EU–India–Gulf Cooperation Council arrangement, involving Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman, could help coordinate these activities without becoming an alliance.
Gidon Bromberg approaches regional security through the proposed “IMEC Peace Triangle”, centred on Israel, Palestine, and Jordan. The proposal rests on the idea that shared infrastructure can create material interests in maintaining cooperation, even where political relations remain unsettled. It links economic integration with climate resilience and regional security, and envisages rail connections through Jordan, Mediterranean ports, renewable electricity, green hydrogen, and water projects that include Palestinian needs. Palestinian participation is important not only for reconstruction but also for the political sustainability of the corridor. Bromberg accepts that economic connectivity “cannot resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or substitute for political agreements”. Rather, shared projects could give the parties stronger reasons to preserve cooperation and protect infrastructure.
For Europe, IMEC is part of a wider shift from efficiency-led globalisation towards strategic de-risking. In “From Chokepoints to Choices”, Kristina Kausch argues that the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the Hormuz crisis have exposed the cost of dependence on individual routes, suppliers, and gatekeepers. The corridor could give Europe greater flexibility and deepen ties with India and Gulf partners, but it cannot replace Suez or remove the political risks along its own route. The eastern maritime leg remains exposed to Gulf instability, while the land bridge through the Levant faces its own political obstacles. Gulf capital, international financial institution funding, and export-credit guarantees will have to be combined coherently, or IMEC risks becoming “a summit brand attached to disconnected upgrades”. Kausch describes the European rationale as “a portfolio of credible routes and partnerships”.
Abhishek Agarwal’s chapter on planning turns to the work required inside India. Much of the country’s industrial base is inland, whereas export gateways are concentrated along the coast. Agarwal proposes integrated spatial planning, multimodal logistics, and port-linked industrial development. He identifies a proposed Gati-Shakti Transport and Logistics Planning and Research Authority (GTLPRA), under the Cabinet Secretariat, as a possible institutional anchor. His planning agenda also covers customs and data interoperability, sustainability and product compliance, faster digital settlement, and transport security. The objective, in his words, is “converting external connectivity into domestic economic value for India”, rather than benefiting only ports and transit operators.
Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan provides the report’s main estimate of the potential economic gains. Using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) framework, he models a 40% reduction in India–Europe transit time, equivalent to a saving of 6.4 days from a 16-day benchmark. In this comparative-static scenario, India’s gross domestic product increases by approximately US$3.535 billion. The United States records the largest absolute gain, at US$3.908 billion. The strongest projected export effects for India are in other manufacturing, at 22.14%, and computers and other electronic products, at 17.65%. He is explicit that “these gains are conditional”. The model excludes possible longer-term effects from productivity, capital accumulation, and foreign investment. Conflict, border delays, incompatible customs systems, and unreliable cargo transfers could also erode the assumed time savings. Gopalakrishnan stresses that the corridor’s economic value “will come from reliable end-to-end operation rather than infrastructure announcements alone”. He recommends better agricultural logistics, permanent coordination, and stronger links between corridor-facing industrial clusters and domestic suppliers.
Afaq Hussain identifies the incomplete Gulf–Mediterranean rail connection, particularly through Jordan, the absence of agreed cross-border transit arrangements, and limited compatibility among national customs systems. Without that rail link, he warns, IMEC “risks being reduced to a formalised India–UAE shipping route”. The India–UAE Virtual Trade Corridor and the Master Application for International Trade and Regulatory Interface (MAITRI) offer a starting point for digital trade facilitation, but remain bilateral initiatives. Hussain proposes extending MAITRI across participating states, standardising cargo data, and appointing national IMEC Sherpas or envoys. He also favours a network of alternative ports and land routes, including options through Oman, Egypt, and Syria. Multiple routes would reduce dependence on a single gateway, but only if rail connections, border clearances, and security procedures work across jurisdictions. Excessive checks could raise costs and undermine the time advantage the corridor is supposed to provide.
Amitendu Palit argues that physical alternatives alone cannot guarantee economic security. Supply chains passing through the region include hydrocarbons, food, fertilisers, semiconductors, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals. Divergent digital-trade rules can interrupt information flows, while uncertainty over responsibility for subsea-cable protection and repairs creates another vulnerability. Once cables are broken, he notes, it is “not clear which countries can authorise operators to repair them”. Cable damage can disrupt trade even when ships and trains continue to move. Palit calls for common arrangements on supply-chain protection, digital trade, and cable governance. Without these, IMEC could reproduce some of the vulnerabilities it is intended to reduce.
Meghna Bal compares India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The DPDPA does not recognise contractual necessity and legitimate interest as general grounds for processing personal data. A carrier may need a recipient’s name, address, and contact details to complete a delivery, even if it has no direct contract with that person. Requiring consent at each stage of a shipment handled by several carriers, ports, and intermediaries would be, in her words, “extremely cumbersome”. Saudi Arabia’s rules on overseas transfers and possible data-localisation requirements add another layer of compliance. Bal proposes that the EU–India Trade and Technology Council develop standardised transfer arrangements and a trusted-corridor mechanism. In the longer term, she argues, India’s data-protection framework would need to recognise contractual necessity and legitimate interest as grounds for commercial processing.
Nithya Kochuparampil compares India’s digital public infrastructure (DPI), including Aadhaar, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), and the Data Empowerment and Protection Architecture, with Europe’s emerging EuroStack. The two models differ most in identity and data governance. India relies on centralised identity infrastructure and consent managers, while the European approach is more federated and places greater weight on privacy safeguards. Neither system can simply be transplanted into the other. Payments offer a more practical starting point for cooperation. She discusses the UPI–TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) link and the multilateral Project Nexus model, while tokenisation and data embassies could help address concerns over sensitive information. Kochuparampil argues that “interoperability rather than exporting either India’s or Europe’s DPI stack” offers the more realistic approach.
In the final chapter, Agarwal argues that participating countries attach different priorities to IMEC. Some see a geopolitical hedge, while others view it as an industrial, logistics, energy, or export opportunity. Track 1.5 diplomacy could bring officials together with researchers, technical experts, financiers, regulators, and private companies to turn these interests into “a shared execution agenda”. For India, he proposes an empowered National Sherpa or inter-ministerial single point of contact, potentially linked to the proposed GTLPRA or the National Security Council Secretariat. A consolidated project pipeline could bring Gulf sovereign funds, European development-finance institutions, and multilateral lenders into project preparation and blended finance. Agarwal identifies the central problem as “execution across institutions, sectors, regulations, financiers, and firms”.
The chapters approach IMEC from different perspectives, but identify a set of connected obstacles to its operation. An operational railway will deliver limited benefits if cargo is delayed at borders. Digital systems cannot support seamless trade when data cannot move under agreed rules. Similarly, individual infrastructure investments may remain disconnected without coordinated financing and political oversight.
The report therefore calls for IMEC to be developed as “a network rather than a fixed route”, supported by formal coordination, compatible customs and payment systems, project finance, and cooperation on energy and security. The test will be whether participating governments can agree on practical arrangements and sustain them long enough for the corridor to function.
