In the report “The Future of China-India Relations: Key Drivers and Scenarios”, published by the Swedish National China Centre in 2026 (Report No. 5), Lisa Zhang and Patrik Andersson examine what lies ahead for relations between Beijing and New Delhi. The report identifies three factors shaping this relationship: the unresolved border dispute, India’s growing economic dependence on China, and the United States’ role in the strategic calculations of both countries. It develops four possible scenarios for the next five years, ranging from closer cooperation to a prolonged military confrontation, and considers what each would mean for Europe.
The authors describe the border dispute as “both a baseline and a barometer for bilateral relations”. They trace its origins to competing territorial claims, particularly the Tibet question, and examine the tensions along the western and eastern sectors of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The 1962 war, the 2017 Doklam standoff, and the 2020 Galwan clash have reinforced mutual distrust. Although the October 2024 patrol agreement helped restore some stability, both countries have continued expanding infrastructure and their military presence along the border. The authors also flag the succession of the Dalai Lama as a potential source of future tension, given the possibility that Beijing and the Tibetan government-in-exile could recognise different successors.
Economic relations present a different picture. Despite persistent political tensions, trade between the two countries has continued to grow, leaving India increasingly dependent on Chinese imports. In 2025, India’s trade deficit with China reached a record $106 billion, with imports concentrated in electronics, machinery, organic chemicals, and plastics. Many of these goods are difficult to source elsewhere. The authors point to a contradiction in New Delhi’s approach: efforts to restrict Chinese investment (only partially eased in early 2026) and reduce import dependence have continued alongside growing demand for Chinese components. Bilateral trade appears to have been largely insulated from the Galwan clash, since the dip in the first half of 2020 was more likely caused by COVID-19 restrictions.
The United States complicates this relationship further. India’s growing defence and strategic cooperation with Washington, particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), has altered Beijing’s perception of New Delhi. Chinese policymakers increasingly see India as part of a wider American effort to contain China. New Delhi, however, tends to view its relationship with Beijing separately from its partnership with Washington. The second Trump administration has added another layer of uncertainty through tariffs, closer US-Pakistan engagement, and Trump’s controversial claim to have brokered a ceasefire following India’s May 2025 military confrontation with Pakistan. The authors suggest that Beijing may calculate that relations with New Delhi will improve without significant concessions from Beijing given the growing strains between India and the United States.
Drawing on these three drivers, Zhang and Andersson construct four scenarios around two uncertainties: the future of the border dispute and the intensity of US-China rivalry.
The first, Strategic Convergence, envisages a settlement of the border dispute followed by closer political and economic cooperation. The authors use the term “Chindia” to describe this possibility, in which both countries could coordinate more closely within BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) while India would have less incentive to pursue stronger ties with the United States and its Quad partners. Such an outcome would require considerable concessions, particularly on the border. Given the prevailing mistrust, economic disagreements, and China-Pakistan partnership, the authors consider it highly unlikely.
Managed Tension, by contrast, is the most likely scenario. Here, both countries would continue rebuilding diplomatic ties while leaving the border dispute unresolved. Trade would expand, but India’s concerns over its trade deficit and limited access to the Chinese market would persist. New Delhi would also continue balancing its relationship with Washington against the need to maintain workable ties with Beijing. This would largely reproduce the current trajectory without resolving its underlying tensions.
The third scenario, Proxy Flashpoint, considers a more dangerous possibility. A deadly clash along the LAC could develop into a prolonged military confrontation, with the United States supporting India and China viewing the conflict as part of a wider containment strategy. The consequences would extend beyond the battlefield. India could face severe disruptions to critical imports, while bilateral trade might come to a complete halt. The Quad could also acquire a stronger security dimension. The authors regard this as highly unlikely over the next five years.
The final scenario, Contained Confrontation, envisages another border clash similar to Galwan, but amid low US-China rivalry and without overt American backing for India. Diplomatic relations would suffer, and both countries could impose restrictions on trade and investment. However, the absence of a broader geopolitical confrontation would leave greater room for de-escalation. The authors consider this possibility more likely than Strategic Convergence or Proxy Flashpoint, though less likely than Managed Tension.
The implications for Europe differ considerably across these scenarios. Improved China-India relations could bring greater regional stability, but deeper economic integration between the two countries might weaken European efforts to reduce dependence on China. A military confrontation, on the other hand, could disrupt supply chains in pharmaceuticals, electronics, automotive manufacturing, and renewable energy equipment. Such a crisis could also create opportunities for India and the European Union to work together on alternative critical raw material supply chains and respond to Chinese export controls and industrial overcapacity.
In their concluding assessment, Zhang and Andersson argue that the border dispute remains the most decisive factor in determining the future of China-India relations. A settlement would be necessary for a fundamental improvement, while another clash could trigger wider confrontation. Yet, for the immediate future, they identify the unpredictability of US policy as the most consequential uncertainty. Their forecast is Managed Tension, although they caution that the other scenarios should not be dismissed. The central challenge for India will be to manage its economic dependence on China while preserving its strategic room for manoeuvre amid intensifying US-China rivalry.