Most analysts expected a less provocative response for several reasons. First, unlike the Jaish-e-Mohammed suicide attack at Pulwama in 2019, for which there was a so-called shaheed video, the attack at Pahalgam lacked a smoking gun bearing the Resistance Front’s imprimatur. Although it should be noted that the organisation, purportedly a front for the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, took credit and then immediately disavowed the attack. Second, unlike Pulwama, in which 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel were murdered, the 28 victims at Pahalgam’s carnage were civilians. Finally, most analysts assumed that targeting the Punjab was off-limits due to the fact that it would goad Pakistan into making its own provocative counter-strikes. However, in hindsight, in the aftermath of Pulwama, when India attacked targets associated with Jaish-e-Mohammed using Israeli-origin SPICE missiles, perhaps it should have been expected that India would up its own ante.
Punjab is the most important province of Pakistan. It particularly has the most salience for Pakistan’s army. Punjab is Pakistan’s strategic centre of gravity, home to most of the country’s economic activities. A plurality of Pakistanis are Punjabi and most of Pakistan’s army personnel—as well as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba personnel—hail from the Punjab. In contrast, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Sindh are peripheral to the thinking of the Pakistan army.
Why Washington stepped in
Pakistan’s response, which reportedly resulted in several downed Indian aircraft, a claim rubbished by the Indian government but generally accepted by the international community, was swift, resulting in a rapidly escalating conflict without ready-made off-ramps. Moreover, India failed to secure fulsome international condemnation of Pakistan’s behaviour or full-throated support of India. Most international actors—including Russia—regurgitated dated talking points about “both sides resolving their conflicts peacefully.” President Donald Trump offered a bizarre formulation in which he claimed both sides have been fighting for “thousands of years”, while Vice President J. D. Vance boldly declared that the conflict was not in the interest of the United States. Such “both sides” talking points reward Pakistan as they acknowledge Pakistani equities in the disputed dispensation of Jammu and Kashmir while punishing India because India does not recognise a disputed status in the state, arguing that it holds the Instrument of Accession for the state signed in October 1947. In the end, the United States was moved to act despite previous statements that it would not do so. The precipitant for American action was evidence that Pakistani and Indian Air Forces had begun to engage in serious dogfights, as well as the fact that Pakistan dispatched some 300 to 400 drones into Indian territory to probe its air defences. The main cause for American concern was the explosions at the Nur Khan air base in Rawalpindi, the garrison city adjacent to Islamabad. As the New York Times reported, this was disconcerting because it is one of the key transport hubs for Pakistan’s military. It also houses the air refuelling capability that keeps Pakistani fighters in the air. Crucially, it is nearby the headquarters of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD). The SPD oversees and secures Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which is believed to include some 170 or so warheads, which are presumed to be dispersed throughout the country. Both India and Pakistan dispute the degree to which the United States was involved or the terms of the tenuous peace that was brokered and announced by President Trump. Despite ceasefire violations that occurred in its wake, the peace appears to be holding.
No compelling reason to change
As the dust continues to settle, independent analysts using satellite imagery will hopefully shed some light on what happened, where and with what outcomes, since neither national press has much legitimacy due to its jingoist and deliberate promulgation of disinformation. However, what can be said of this conflict is that it will not deter Pakistan from future terrorist adventurism.
The reasons for this are several. First, from the Pakistan army’s point of view, the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 is incomplete because Kashmir did not become a part of Pakistan. Without Kashmir, Pakistan is inherently an incomplete state. This has been a narrative that has been promulgated since the time of the state’s inception. Muhammad Ali Jinnah himself—Pakistan’s founder—emphasised the importance of Kashmir for Pakistan, noting that it was the jugular vein of the country. There is a wide consensus across Pakistan’s military, political elites and ordinary Pakistanis alike that Kashmir belongs to Pakistan. In other words, the geographical dispensation is a source of ontological insecurity for the Pakistani state and its citizenry.
