Amrita Jash and Don McLain Gill, in India in the South China Sea: Act East Policy and the Quest for Strategic Relevance (The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies, 2026), argue that India’s engagement in the South China Sea (SCS) cannot be dismissed as peripheral simply because of geography. Instead, they position India’s involvement as a function of converging economic dependence, strategic recalibration, and regional demand, making the SCS central to India’s evolving Indo-Pacific role. As they state, the SCS is “inextricably linked to India’s economic prosperity and security as a rising Indo-Pacific power.”
The article traces a clear shift in India’s posture from restraint to articulation. Earlier characterised by a “cautious, neutral stance,” India has moved towards “active engagement and open support for freedom of navigation” and the legal framework of UNCLOS. This shift is not merely rhetorical. It reflects a deeper reconceptualisation of the SCS within India’s strategic geography, where the region is no longer external but embedded in India’s security and economic calculus. The authors link this transition directly to material stakes, particularly trade and energy flows, which render stability in the SCS a core national interest rather than a distant concern.
The authors then identify the structural drivers behind this transformation. China’s expanding maritime and continental footprint emerges as the primary catalyst, especially its growing presence in the Indian Ocean and assertiveness in the SCS. This is reinforced by the tightening of US–India strategic ties, the revival of the Quad, and the broader consolidation of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic theatre. The Galwan Valley clash sharpens India’s threat perception, while Southeast Asian states’ increasing willingness to engage India creates the external space for its expanded role. Taken together, these factors explain why India’s policy shift is neither abrupt nor purely voluntary, but a cumulative response to systemic pressures.
Empirically, the article shows that India’s response has taken the form of calibrated security engagement rather than direct balancing. Defence partnerships with Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, alongside naval exercises and arms transfers, indicate an effort to position India as a credible maritime partner. Yet the authors are explicit about the limits of this role. India’s engagements “must not be equated” with a readiness to intervene militarily in a conflict scenario, underscoring a strategy that privileges capacity-building and presence over confrontation.
A critical dimension of the analysis is the role of the United States. The authors treat Washington not just as a partner but as a structural variable shaping India’s option. US support has enabled India’s eastward expansion, but fluctuations in American commitment introduce uncertainty. The possibility of a US–China accommodation or reduced US prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific complicates India’s strategic calculations, potentially constraining its ability to sustain an assertive posture in the SCS.
From this, three analytical claims emerge. First, India’s engagement in the SCS is driven by functional imperatives, particularly trade security, energy access, and the preservation of a rules-based order. Second, India’s approach reflects incremental balancing, combining limited military activism with diplomatic and normative positioning. Third, structural constraints, especially weak economic integration with ASEAN and divergent Southeast Asian threat perceptions, limit the depth of India’s regional influence.
The article concludes that the Act East Policy has repositioned the SCS from a peripheral theatre to a central arena in India’s strategic thinking, but without transforming India into a decisive security provider. India remains an “emerging security and development partner” whose role is expanding but conditional, shaped by both external alignments and internal limitations.