The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi brought together countries that broadly agree that the international system does not adequately reflect the weight and interests of the Global South. Beyond that broad consensus, however, their priorities differ considerably. India called for a greater role for developing countries in global rule-making; China emphasised economic and technological cooperation; Russia focused on new centres of global growth; Brazil stressed multilateralism and protectionism; South Africa highlighted development; and Iran pushed for resistance to sanctions and stronger BRICS institutions. Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia focused more on development, resilience and strategic autonomy, while the UAE emphasised practical economic cooperation. Saudi Arabia used the summit to underline Gulf security and sovereignty. The New Delhi Declaration provided common ground, but the individual interventions offer a clearer picture of what the countries themselves want from BRICS.
India: From Rule-Taker to Rule-Shaper
For India, the central issue was the imbalance between the growing weight of the Global South and its limited influence over global rule-making. Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for the transformation of the existing “pyramid of privilege” into a “platform of partnership” and urged the Global South to become a “rule-shaper”. He also warned against the “weaponization of technology and critical minerals”, linking geopolitical competition with supply-chain vulnerabilities. India’s message was therefore about reform rather than replacing the existing system. Modi pushed for greater representation for developing countries, stronger economic cooperation, resilient supply chains and institutional mechanisms that can carry BRICS decisions forward beyond an annual summit. The approach also reflected India’s preference for a BRICS that gives the Global South greater agency without turning the grouping into an explicitly anti-Western alliance.
China: Build BRICS into a Stronger Economic and Technological Platform
Chinese President Xi Jinping described BRICS as “the most influential cooperation platform in today’s world for emerging markets and developing countries”. His emphasis was on using that platform to deepen economic, industrial and technological cooperation while giving the grouping a larger role in global governance. China proposed cooperation on AI-enabled industrialisation, research and development, industrial and supply chains, and an AI Open Source Zone. Xi’s approach suggests that Beijing sees BRICS as more than a diplomatic forum. It can become an economic ecosystem connecting major emerging economies while increasing their collective influence over global rules and standards. Unlike a purely political coalition, this model gives BRICS practical areas of cooperation in technology, trade and industry, while still supporting China’s broader argument for a more representative international order.
Russia: Strengthen Alternative Economic Centres
Russian President Vladimir Putin presented BRICS as part of a wider transformation in the global economy. Speaking at the BRICS Business Forum, he argued that “the world has entered a period of deep structural shifts”, with new centres of economic growth emerging alongside established ones. Russia’s emphasis was therefore on expanding trade, transport, finance and investment networks that are less vulnerable to Western restrictions. Putin backed proposals including a BRICS insurance mechanism and grain market, while highlighting the role of the New Development Bank. Moscow’s interest in BRICS is consequently both economic and strategic. The grouping gives Russia additional channels for trade and investment at a time when Western sanctions have restricted many of its traditional economic links. But rather than simply presenting BRICS as an anti-Western bloc, Moscow’s argument is that the global economy is becoming more distributed and BRICS should help shape that transition.
Brazil: Defend Multilateralism and Economic Openness
Brazil approached the summit from a strongly economic and multilateral perspective. Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, representing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, warned that “protectionism, economic coercion and unilateral sanctions” were threatening the global economy and argued that closer links between BRICS economies were increasingly important. Brasília’s approach differs from the idea of turning BRICS into a geopolitical counterweight to the West. Brazil sees value in the grouping as a way to diversify economic partnerships and strengthen the bargaining position of emerging economies while retaining multilateral institutions as the main framework for international cooperation. Its position also explains why Brazil has generally favoured an expanded but flexible BRICS, where members can cooperate on trade, finance and development without having to adopt a single geopolitical line.
South Africa: Make Development the Measure of BRICS
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa linked BRICS’ geopolitical relevance to its ability to deliver economic gains. He warned that “the relevance of the United Nations and the durability of multilateralism” were under pressure, but also argued that BRICS must translate its partnerships into “tangible economic growth and development”. South Africa wants the expanded grouping to support African industrialisation, infrastructure and greater value addition rather than reproduce the old pattern in which developing countries export raw materials while manufacturing and technology remain concentrated elsewhere. Ramaphosa’s position therefore combines reform of global governance with a practical development agenda. For Pretoria, the credibility of BRICS will ultimately depend not only on what it says about the international order but also on whether its expanded membership produces investment, manufacturing and technological opportunities for developing economies.
Iran: Use BRICS to Resist Sanctions
Iran brought the most explicitly sanctions-focused agenda to the summit. President Masoud Pezeshkian called for BRICS to resist unilateral sanctions, strengthen economic links and establish a permanent secretariat. Tehran wants the grouping to become more capable of translating political declarations into institutional and economic mechanisms. Pezeshkian also emphasised the greater use of national currencies in trade. Iran’s interest in BRICS is therefore more than economic cooperation. It sees the grouping as a possible means of reducing the effectiveness of sanctions and challenging what it regards as the concentration of power in existing global institutions. At the same time, the summit demonstrated the limits of that ambition. The final declaration adopted language on the Middle East that reflected a broader consensus rather than Iran’s more confrontational position.
Egypt: Turn Cooperation into Practical Tools
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi emphasised the need to turn BRICS cooperation into practical responses to interconnected economic and security challenges. For Cairo, this includes concerns over trade, energy, supply chains and the stability of the Middle East and Red Sea. Egypt’s position illustrates how BRICS has become useful to countries that are less interested in building a geopolitical bloc than in expanding their economic and diplomatic options. Its membership also gives BRICS a stronger connection to both Africa and the Arab world. Sisi’s engagement with Iranian President Pezeshkian on the summit’s sidelines further demonstrated the forum’s diplomatic utility, allowing countries with differing positions on regional conflicts to maintain dialogue even amid wider tensions.
Ethiopia: Use BRICS for Development and Industrialisation
For Ethiopia, BRICS is primarily an opportunity to connect African resources and markets with capital, technology and industrial capacity. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stressed the need to create greater value from Ethiopia’s minerals, renewable energy and other resources rather than simply exporting them. His approach reflects a wider African interest in ensuring that BRICS expansion produces tangible development benefits. Ethiopia also sees opportunities in technology and AI as tools for economic transformation. Its position is consequently less about challenging Western power directly and more about widening the range of partners available for development. In this respect, BRICS offers Addis Ababa access to major economies while strengthening its voice in discussions about finance, industrialisation and the development needs of African countries.
Indonesia: Strategic Autonomy Without Alignment
Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto approached BRICS through the language of resilience and strategic autonomy. He argued that the grouping’s combined strengths in critical minerals, energy and technology should produce tangible economic benefits and warned against dependence on major powers. “We do not like being dictated to by one or two specific powers”, he said. Jakarta’s approach reflects its preference for maintaining room for manoeuvre rather than aligning permanently with any major power centre. Indonesia sees BRICS as another platform through which it can increase its bargaining power, strengthen economic resilience and expand cooperation on energy, technology and food security. Its position is therefore neither explicitly anti-Western nor centred on replacing the existing international system. The value of BRICS lies in giving Indonesia more choices within that system.
UAE: Keep BRICS Practical
The UAE’s position was among the most commercially pragmatic. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan led the UAE delegation, with the country emphasising trade, investment, technology, energy and financial cooperation. Abu Dhabi’s approach reflects its wider foreign policy, which seeks relationships across different geopolitical centres rather than alignment with a single bloc. This is particularly significant given the UAE’s participation alongside Iran during a period of intense regional conflict. The meeting between Sheikh Khaled and Pezeshkian on the summit’s sidelines also showed how BRICS can provide diplomatic space even when members have sharply different interests. For the UAE, the grouping’s value appears to lie less in ideological alignment than in expanding economic connections and maintaining diplomatic flexibility.
Saudi Arabia: Put Gulf Security at the Centre
Saudi Arabia occupies a somewhat different position within the BRICS story. Riyadh participated in the summit as an invited country, with Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan representing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. At the summit, Faisal focused on sovereignty, territorial integrity and Gulf security. He said that “the security of the Arabian Gulf cannot be achieved without respecting the sovereignty and independence of its states and refraining from interference in their internal affairs”. He also stressed freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz because of its importance to energy security and global trade. Saudi participation therefore showed how BRICS can provide a platform for countries to advance specific national and regional interests without necessarily subscribing to a common geopolitical agenda.
What the Positions Tell Us
The individual statements reveal that, despite areas of strategic convergence, BRICS lacks a single, unified strategic purpose. There is broad agreement that developing countries want greater influence over global governance and that the existing distribution of power does not adequately reflect today’s economic realities. But the reasons for wanting a stronger BRICS vary sharply.
India wants a greater voice in rule-making without abandoning multilateralism. China wants deeper economic and technological cooperation alongside greater global influence. Russia sees BRICS as a way to strengthen alternative economic networks. Brazil wants to defend multilateralism and diversify economic partnerships. South Africa and Ethiopia emphasise development and industrialisation. Iran wants protection from sanctions and stronger BRICS institutions. Indonesia values strategic autonomy, while the UAE prioritises economic connectivity and diplomatic flexibility. Saudi Arabia is using its engagement to put Gulf security and sovereignty on the agenda.
That diversity may actually be one of BRICS’ strengths. Its members do not need to agree on a single geopolitical project to find value in the same platform. The New Delhi summit showed that countries with very different interests can still cooperate where those interests overlap. But it also demonstrated the limits of that cooperation, particularly on the conflicts and security questions dividing members.
The most useful way to understand BRICS after New Delhi summit, therefore, may be not as a bloc with a single agenda, but as a platform being used by different countries for different purposes. Its influence will depend on how far those interests can continue to overlap without requiring the members to resolve their fundamental differences.
Note: This explainer has been researched, edited, and fact-checked by India’s World staff and prepared with AI assistance.