In the article “Bridging the Gulf: Shifting Perceptions and Strategic Alignment Between India and the Gulf States”, published in India Review (2026, Vol. 25, Nos. 3–4, pp. 429–444), Nicolas Blarel examines how India’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have evolved since 2014. He argues that Gulf perceptions of India have shifted from viewing it primarily as a labour-sending country and energy importer to recognising it as a strategic, economic, and security partner. The author describes this change as a transition from a “transactional relationship to a strategic partnership”.
Blarel begins by tracing the historical foundations of India’s engagement with the Gulf. Following independence, Jawaharlal Nehru’s government pursued a pro-Arab foreign policy, supporting Palestinian aspirations and maintaining distance from Israel. Energy security and the protection of maritime trade routes, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal, nevertheless remained important considerations. India’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 subsequently opened the way for a wider engagement with Middle Eastern countries.
The author argues that economic relations have expanded considerably beyond energy imports. India’s share in the GCC’s trade has grown, with bilateral trade reaching $184 billion in 2023. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have become particularly important partners through investments in Indian infrastructure, technology, and energy sectors. The India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), signed in 2022, reflects this growing economic engagement.
Blarel also examines the role of the Indian diaspora, comprising approximately 8–9 million people across the Gulf. Contributing around $50 billion annually in remittances, the community has increasingly become a political and economic bridge between the two regions. Greater recognition of Indian workers, labour reforms, and the growing acceptance of Indian cultural institutions, including the Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi, have contributed to this shift.
The paper then turns to the expansion of strategic and security cooperation. Through its “Think West” policy, India has increasingly treated the Middle East as part of its “extended neighbourhood”. Relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and other Gulf countries have expanded through defence agreements, joint military exercises, maritime security cooperation, and intelligence-sharing. Gulf governments have also become more responsive to India’s counterterrorism concerns, particularly through extraditions and cooperation against financial fugitives.
Blarel places these developments against the backdrop of China’s growing presence in the region and declining confidence in American security commitments. China’s investments in ports and infrastructure, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative, have raised concerns in New Delhi. The competition surrounding Gwadar and Chabahar illustrates these strategic tensions. Meanwhile, Gulf countries have sought to diversify their external partnerships as questions have emerged about the reliability of United States security guarantees. Although India cannot replace the United States as the region’s principal security provider in the short term, it has become a more relevant regional partner.
The author also examines India’s participation in newer regional arrangements. The Abraham Accords created opportunities for closer engagement with Israel and the Gulf states, while the I2U2 grouping brought together India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the 2023 G20 Summit, further reflects India’s ambitions to expand its economic and infrastructure presence in the region and partly counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
In his conclusion, Blarel argues that India’s policy of strategic multi-alignment has enabled it to maintain relations with competing regional actors, including Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, without openly taking sides in their disputes. However, the Gaza war, the Red Sea crisis, and the 2026 conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran have exposed the limits of this approach. India’s growing partnerships have also raised expectations of a more active security role. The author points to Modi’s May 2026 visit to the UAE, which resulted in agreements on energy security and defence cooperation, as an indication of closer bilateral alignment. He cautions that these developments, alongside the growing Saudi-Pakistan security relationship, could partly break with India’s traditional balancing strategy.
The article’s central argument is that India’s growing economic importance and expanding security engagement have changed how the Gulf states view New Delhi. However, the ability to maintain relations across competing regional blocs is becoming increasingly difficult as instability intensifies. Blarel’s analysis raises an important question for Indian foreign policy: can New Delhi deepen its strategic role in the Gulf without compromising the multi-alignment that has allowed it to engage with the region’s competing powers?