The war in Iran has exposed a growing strain in the US defence system. Washington still has the military capacity to operate across several theatres, but the conflict has also highlighted how quickly key stocks of missiles and interceptors can be drawn down when the United States is supporting Ukraine, Israel, Europe and the Indo-Pacific at the same time. This has put the US defence-industrial base under greater pressure to produce more, and to do so faster.
On 11 June, President Donald Trump invoked the Defence Production Act (DPA) via a memorandum, granting the US president extraordinary power over matters of national defence and emergencies. Established in 1950 during the Korean War, the Act empowers the federal government to mobilise industry and to give preference to military contracts over commercial ones. Trump’s DPA move came amid depleted US munition stocks and supply-chain constraints due to US operations in Iran (Operation Epic Fury, launched jointly with Israel on 28 February) and prolonged security assistance for Ukraine, Israel, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific.
Earlier, on 6 February, Trump signed an executive order establishing the “America First Arms Transfer Strategy”, a re-modification of the US’s conventional arms transfer policy. Then, on 3 April, Trump released his FY2027 budget estimate, requesting $1.45 trillion for the Department of Defence, comprising $1.1 trillion in discretionary and $350 billion in mandatory spending, 44% above the $1.01 trillion enacted for FY2026. The $1.5 trillion figure is the president’s stated ambition rather than the sum submitted to Congress. Trump also mentioned that the estimated budget would be sourced through tariff revenues. These two events are closely associated with Trump’s 7 January Truth Social post, which announced a hike in the defence budget amid “troubled and dangerous times”.
