It is rarely acknowledged, but regional policy patterns inherited from the British Raj continue to linger on in the contemporary Indian discourse on its neighbourhood. This Raj legacy includes the concept of a regional sphere of influence, the principle that “external” or “extra-regional” powers should not interfere in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. It also includes the conviction that Delhi is entitled to ‘special’—if not ‘exclusive’—relationships with its immediate neighbours.
The regional system of the British era traces its origins to the Treaty of Allahabad, signed in August 1765 between the East India Company, Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II, Shuja-ud-Daula (the Nawab of Awadh), and Mir Qasim (the Nawab of Bengal). This treaty followed the East India Company’s decisive victory at the Battle of Buxar in 1764, which established British dominance in eastern India.
The Allahabad Treaty had two key elements. First, it transformed the East India Company from a trading to a territorial entity, embedding the Company Raj into the subcontinent’s state system of the late 18th century. Under the treaty, the Mughal Emperor granted the Diwani rights (the right to collect revenue) in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa to the East India Company. This grant effectively gave the Company control over these regions’ vast resources and administration, establishing the foundation for its future expansion and power consolidation in India.
This treaty not only expanded British influence but also set precedents for future agreements that would shape the subcontinent’s political landscape. It marked the beginning of systematic British control and established a colonial state that would persist for nearly two centuries.
Second, the treaty introduced the concept of a ‘buffer state’ designed to secure the Company rule in Bengal. This latter element became a concrete and expansive feature of British India’s security system and persists, if in a diluted form, in post-colonial India’s regional policy.
For the East India Company, the Allahabad Treaty positioned Awadh as a buffer between Company-controlled Bengal and potential threats—the marauding Afghans in the northwest and the rising Marathas in the west. As the British Raj rapidly expanded, the concept of buffer states and its variants (like protectorates) became fundamental to the subcontinent’s regional security structure. Protectorates maintained less autonomy than buffer states and were neutralised in British India’s favour.
Creating a glacis
Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India at the turn of the 20th century, noted that as the empire expanded, buffer states would become protectorates, and protectorates would eventually be annexed into the empire. The empire was, after all, a dynamic and expanding entity. As it consolidated control over the subcontinent and encountered other empires on its periphery, it established specific arrangements for external boundaries: the Durand Line with Afghanistan (1893), the boundary agreement with Persia on the borders of Baluchistan (1896), and the McMahon Line with Tibet/China (1913).
The Allahabad Treaty… not only expanded British influence but also set precedents for future agreements that would shape the subcontinent’s political landscape. It marked the beginning of systematic British control and established a colonial state that would persist for nearly two centuries
By the turn of the 20th century, a “three-fold frontier” emerged for India, providing the foundation for British paramountcy in the subcontinent. First was the ‘boundary of jurisdiction’, where the Raj exercised full sovereign and administrative control. Second was the ‘boundary of influence’, extending beyond jurisdiction into tribal zones from Baluchistan to Burma. In these areas, the Raj established arrangements with tribal chieftains, who helped protect against external powers in exchange for economic subsidies and internal autonomy. Beyond this lay the ring of protectorates and buffer states friendly to the Raj.
This three-fold frontier created a glacis around India that helped prevent rival European powers from undermining the Raj. The fear that hostile powers might collaborate with disgruntled elements within India has remained a persistent threat to this day. (The “foreign hand” has deep roots in modern India’s territorial construction). In this “Great Game,” the Raj initially focused on the French threat during the Napoleonic era. Attention later shifted to Czarist Russia’s expansion across Eurasia and imperial Germany’s ambitions in the Middle East and South Asia. The Communist Soviet Union, succeeding Czarist Russia in 1917, nurtured similar aspirations—hoping to ignite a revolution against the British Empire in India and Asia.
