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COP31 in Antalya: Key Issues and Challenges

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In August, a glacier collapse in the Himalayas sent floodwaters through Nepal, killing nearly 1,500 people and leaving thousands missing. When COP31, the 31st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), opened in Antalya, Türkiye, on 9 November, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell pointed to the disaster in calling for the world to act “faster and fairer”. COP31 runs until 20 November.

The projections help explain the urgency. UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report 2026 expects warming to exceed 1.5°C. Even its best pathway sees temperatures peak at 1.7–1.8°C, while full delivery of current national pledges points to about 2.6°C this century. COP31 opened shortly after the tenth anniversary of the Paris Agreement’s entry into force, but without the world’s largest historical emitter. The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement took effect on 27 January 2026, and Washington has stayed away from the talks for a second year. Only the British prime minister among G7 leaders was scheduled to attend.

An Unusual Division of Leadership

Antalya is testing an unusual leadership arrangement. Türkiye and Australia both bid to host COP31, and the standoff ended in a power-sharing deal. Türkiye hosts the summit, holds the COP Presidency, and leads the voluntary Action Agenda. Australia’s Climate and Energy Minister, Chris Bowen, serves as President of Negotiations and oversees the formal texts. Neither can dictate the outcome: decisions require consensus, allowing any Party to block agreement. The presidency has more direct influence over declarations and initiatives outside the negotiating rooms.

The division became clear on the opening day, when disagreement over the formal agenda quickly turned to finance.

Finance Dominates the Opening Agenda

Developing countries, including India, came to Antalya seeking a standalone agenda item on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, which requires developed countries to provide financial resources to developing countries. The two-year Climate Finance Work Programme had been established at COP30 in Belém. But while the EU argued that it did not need a separate agenda item, India maintained that Belém had agreed to one. The opening plenary adopted the programme as a standalone item. Two African Group proposals, on tripling adaptation finance and climate-related trade measures, were left off the agenda. Funding for the Green Climate Fund will be considered under an existing item.

The agenda dispute reflects a wider disagreement over what counts as climate finance. At COP29 in Baku, developed countries agreed to take the lead in mobilising at least US$300 billion a year by 2035, alongside a broader call to raise US$1.3 trillion annually from all sources. Developing countries say this goal does not replace the Article 9.1 obligation. They want finance that is predictable, largely public, and concessional, rather than debt-creating support. By 14 November, the programme’s scope and duration were still unresolved, and a draft text offered options to conclude it at COP32 or continue it until COP33.

Adaptation funding shows the gap. UNEP estimates that developing countries will need US$305 billion annually by 2035, compared with US$28.2–31.7 billion in international public adaptation finance in 2024. Belém called for adaptation finance to be at least tripled by 2035, five years later than developing countries had sought and without a clear baseline. Even that increase would cover only part of the need. At a ministerial dialogue on 13 November, UN climate chief Simon Stiell said that meeting an aggregate target does not necessarily meet countries’ needs. He called for easier access and highly concessional terms for the most vulnerable economies.

Donor governments face competing pressures. Western governments are prioritising defence and domestic living costs as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East put further pressure on public budgets. The US war on Iran has driven up oil and gas prices. Some new initiatives have emerged. British, Norwegian, and Canadian development-finance institutions launched the “10by30” collaboration, which aims to originate US$10 billion in climate finance for emerging markets by 2030, including private capital expected to be mobilised. Small island states are also exploring a remittance-backed fund that would levy a 3% charge on remittances and invest the proceeds in an endowment for resilience projects. Its backers estimate that it could raise about US$3 billion a year, compared with roughly US$2 billion in public adaptation finance received by the islands in 2021–22.

Loss and damage brings the discussion back to Nepal. The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage has provisionally allocated US$21.6 million for Nepal’s recovery after the August disaster, marking its first move into delivery. The UN climate chief called the allocation a very positive step, but said the fund alone could not meet the scale of the losses.

Electrification and the Unresolved Fossil-Fuel Question

Fossil fuels remain an unresolved issue. At COP28, countries agreed to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, but set no deadline. At COP30, more than 80 countries backed a roadmap that was omitted from the final text. Brazil is now steering a voluntary roadmap outside the formal talks. The adopted agenda contains no separate item on fossil fuels. At the Leaders’ Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres used his address to accuse the fossil-fuel lobby of delaying action.

Türkiye has put electrification at the centre of its presidency. Its voluntary 35-by-35 pledge sets a target of raising electricity’s share of global final energy consumption from about 23% today to 35% by 2035, through the electrification of transport, buildings, and industry. But it does not require the additional electricity to come from renewables. The EU has therefore insisted that electrification be “clean”. This matters because governments’ planned fossil-fuel production in 2030 is more than twice the level consistent with a 1.5°C pathway. Rising demand can still be met by coal and gas.

The Electrify Now Finance Coalition was launched on 10 November to bring development banks, governments, and investors together. The Climate Investment Funds announced US$94 million in catalytic finance intended to mobilise more than US$1.2 billion in private investment. The coalition seeks to address a funding imbalance: developing economies account for around 80% of electricity-demand growth, but Africa receives about 2% of energy-transition investment.

Mitigation remains contested inside the negotiating rooms. The Mitigation Work Programme is due to end in 2026, and Parties are divided over whether and how to extend it. The Arab Group, the African Group, and Malaysia support an extension to 2030; the EU and Mongolia have proposed 2040.

India: Clean-Energy Investment and Policy Space

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell pointed to India’s Green Energy Corridor Phase III as a major step forward. The project aims to evacuate up to 135 GW of renewable power and deploy 50 GWh of battery storage by 2032–33. India’s third Nationally Determined Contribution, submitted in April, sets an emissions-intensity reduction target of 47% below 2005 levels by 2035. It also raises the non-fossil share of installed power capacity to 60% by 2035, from the 50% target for 2030 that India says it has already met.

At the negotiating table, New Delhi has sought to protect its policy space. On 3 November, Environment Minister Bhupender Yadav set out India’s priorities: predictable climate finance, party-driven mitigation and adaptation, technology transfer, and just transition. He said voluntary initiatives under the Presidency’s Action Agenda, including 35-by-35, should remain separate from formal negotiations, and that global targets must reflect national circumstances. Yadav also ruled out support for a fossil-fuel phase-out, citing India’s energy needs, and reiterated opposition to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which India sees as a unilateral burden on exporters.

India’s opening statement was delivered on 10 November by Environment Ministry Secretary Narendra Bhooshan. It aligned India with G77 and China, the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), and BASIC, and reaffirmed Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). It placed public finance under Article 9.1 at the centre of implementation, but announced no new funding commitment. India’s third NDC similarly ties further ambition to new and additional finance from developed countries. India co-chairs the mitigation consultations with Germany. On 17 November, Yadav and Germany’s Environment Minister Carsten Schneider are due to co-chair a ministerial on pre-2030 ambition. That gives India a direct role in shaping the terms of the discussion.

South Asia: Shared Risks, Different Priorities

South Asian countries are not negotiating as a bloc. Their priorities reflect different exposures to climate change. Nepal and Bhutan jointly proposed an agenda item on “1.5°C Warming in Mountains”, seeking a dedicated work programme and mountain-specific adaptation indicators. Despite the August disaster, their proposal, like a separate submission from Kyrgyzstan, failed to win the backing of major negotiating blocs. The Presidency instead offered consultations on mountains and a research dialogue. On 12 November, Nepal, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan co-hosted an event on glaciers and mountain resilience. Nepal’s Foreign Minister, Shisir Khanal, used the meeting to call for grant-based adaptation finance and direct support for loss and damage.

Finance also featured in South Asian leaders’ statements. Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman called for at least half of international climate finance to go towards adaptation, alongside debt relief. Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif asked for grant-based finance that would not add to debt, citing the 2022 floods. Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu sought replenishment of the Green Climate Fund and further resources for the Loss and Damage Fund. Sri Lanka and Bhutan are scheduled to speak when the high-level segment resumes on 17–18 November. Afghanistan is not on the published speaker list.

What Remains at Stake in the Final Week

Simon Stiell, the UN climate chief, opened the second week by urging Parties to move quickly and warning that any agreement would require compromise. Positions on a possible cover decision remain far apart. The African Group objects to electrification targets without the means to implement them; the Arab Group rejects top-down sectoral pathways; and the EU wants language on transitioning away from fossil fuels. Parties must also define the Just Transition Mechanism agreed at Belém. The second Global Stocktake begins in Antalya and runs until 2028, informing the next round of national climate plans.

Technical progress on finance access or adaptation may prove more consequential than a high-profile pledge. For India, the test is whether climate action is matched by finance and technology, while leaving countries room to choose their own pathways. For Nepal and its neighbours, it is whether the summit’s response to the Himalayan disaster includes support they can actually access. The decisions due on 20 November will show whether COP31 has produced practical steps alongside its political commitments.

Note: This explainer has been researched, edited, and fact-checked by India’s World staff and prepared with AI assistance.

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