As the world finds itself in an interregnum between the post-WWII international order and one which is more multipolar, transactional, and “realist”, conventional wisdom holds that multi-aligned India would fare well in this new environment. Strategic communities, however, ought to be crystal clear about the limits of their strategy of choice, even if it is ultimately deemed optimal under the circumstances. New Delhi may have long been propagating for a multilateral, multi-aligned world, but this should not be confused with actually being well-prepared for it.
India Ahead of the Multi-Alignment Curve
Definitional issues aside, “multi-alignment” breaks with traditional non-alignment by proactively cooperating with key powers on certain, limited issues, while maintaining India’s traditional premium on strategic autonomy—by avoiding formal alliances, not limiting alignment options for any one partner’s sake, and limiting alignments only to matters of narrowly understood national interest. Though criticised by some as inadequate fence-sitting, the expert reception of this strategy has been mostly positive.
Recent developments seem to justify some of the Indian strategists’ self-confidence. China may be entering what Tanaka Naoki calls the “great stagnation.”. Moscow keeps pushing westward, yet its long-term outlook is marked by economic stagnation, demographic decline, and diplomatic challenges, with a probable drop in global economic and political rankings by 2040–2045 and its future status as a “great power” increasingly questioned. America is shifting its role from chief architect of the international system to opportunistic predator, with unknown intentions ranging from leading like-minded countries towards a new international order that limits the power of authoritarian states to acting as a rogue superpower seeking undisguised American dominance.