India and Pakistan are yet again in the midst of a standoff resulting from the egregious Pahalgam terror attack. India has announced some steps in response, largely symbolic, with the exception of holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance. This step, though a significant psychological blow to the water-starved lower riparian, may not result in consequential withholding of Pakistan’s share of water in the immediate future because of the absence of necessary infrastructure. It is too early to say whether it would induce Pakistan to change or become a source of larger conflict. Pakistan has said that withholding its water would be an act of war, and has threatened that it “shall exercise the right to hold all bilateral agreements with India including but not limited to Simla Agreement in abeyance.”
A reprise of familiar scenarios
In a repeat of the familiar script, calls for restraint are growing from our international partners and will become louder if things are seen moving up the escalation ladder. The US has called for de-escalation and maintenance of peace and security in South Asia, while urging Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the attack.
The response of the Narendra Modi government to the Uri and Pulwama terror attacks, together with the need to assuage public outrage at the Pahalgam massacre, makes a kinetic punitive response likely, especially since Pakistan’s response remains belligerent, with the exception of a diversionary proposal for an impartial international probe. This will inevitably result in retaliatory action by Pakistan, posing the challenge of escalation control. The region waits with bated breath for the denouement of the ongoing crisis. But whatever the denouement, it is unlikely to put an enduring end to Pakistan’s terror, much less resolve India’s larger Pakistan problem. The reasons are not far to seek.
There is no end in sight to the stranglehold of the army on the Pakistani polity. The army-led establishment continues to regard an adversarial posture towards India, and sustenance of the India bogey, as in its interest. It has shown no inclination to abnegate the instrument of terror. The coercive steps taken by India so far have failed to induce Pakistan to mend its ways. The nuclear dimension has made it extremely risky for India to give a decisive military blow to Pakistan to coerce it into changing its behaviour. Short of that, India has kinetic options in the tactical domain to inflict pain on Pakistan, and such action was in evidence after the Uri and Pulwama attacks. However, these options have only a temporary impact till the adversary recovers, adapts and goes back to his bad ways.
The road to an impasse
The above policy limitations have to be seen in the backdrop of certain developments that have added to the complexity of the relationship. The Mumbai terror attack was a watershed in turning the Indian public opinion largely against any peace moves towards Pakistan. India did manage to stabilise the relationship for some time following Pakistan’s half-hearted action to prosecute some Mumbai perpetrators, but that effort unravelled in 2013 onwards.
The popular slogan “terror and talks cannot go together” in the run up to the 2014 election, though not followed uniformly as a policy subsequently, has become a catchphrase in the public mind and, combined with hardening of the political discourse on Pakistan, has further discredited diplomacy. This is so in spite of the absence of a correlation between the existence or non-existence of bilateral dialogue and the level of Pakistan’s terror activity, which depends upon other factors, such as its internal preoccupations and its geopolitical circumstances at a given moment.
