The Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir in which 26 tourists were killed by a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) squad on 22 April 2025 provided an opportunity for India and Afghanistan to reconnect, by design or default. Two recent developments that occurred around this time point towards a growing bond between New Delhi and Kabul—the first being External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s outreach to his counterpart Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi on the phone, and the second, Deputy Minister of Interior, Ibrahim Sadr’s New Delhi visit soon after the Pahalgam attack. India’s remarks (MEA officials) after Jaishankar’s call that “bold moves” would be taken to bolster relations seem to suggest that New Delhi is now open to recognising the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
Today, the one thing that India and Afghanistan share in common is strained relations with Pakistan, and this provides the underpinnings for New Delhi to potentially recognise the Taliban government in Kabul in the near future. This may be a heretic and insane proposal, but in the larger strategic game plan, such a move would make sense, if Kabul is willing to help India with its Pakistan problem. Afghanistan’s Pakistan problem today is that it no longer wants to bend to Islamabad’s will as in the past, and, consequently, Pakistan blames Kabul for supporting and promoting terrorist activities in Pakistan, including those by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, an organisation supporting Islamist militant groups along the Afghan–Pakistani border. Further, Pakistan’s decision to deport thousands of Afghan refugees who have been living in Pakistan for decades now has soured ties. For India, ties with Pakistan have remained tense since 1947 and both countries have fought four wars. Islamabad’s sponsorship of terrorism in India, the latest being the Pahalgam attack, resulted in the Indian response, codenamed Operation Sindoor.
India–Afghanistan ties, on the other hand, have historically been friendly and the focus on the Afghan people has allowed New Delhi to deliver humanitarian assistance irrespective of the governments in power. This is true even today with the Taliban in office. Other strategic issues like the Chabahar Port ensure that regional security plays an important role in India’s engagement with the Taliban.
A Phone Call and a Mysterious Visit
Jaishankar’s call to Muttaqi on 15 May came days after the Taliban condemned the Pahalgam attack. The call assumes significance as it is India’s first ministerial-level outreach to Afghanistan’s Taliban administration. In a post on X (previously Twitter) shortly after the phone call, Jaishankar wrote, “Good conversation with Acting Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi this evening. Deeply appreciate his condemnation of the Pahalgam terrorist attack.” The primary rationale for the call was thus to articulate the Taliban’s support to India. With a view to maintaining the momentum of India’s assistance to the Afghan people, Jaishankar also underlined India’s traditional friendship with Afghanistan. On the alleged Indian missile attacks on Afghanistan, Jaishankar welcomed Muttaqi’s “firm rejection of recent attempts to create distrust between India and Afghanistan through false and baseless reports” by Pakistan.
But even before the historic phone call between the two foreign ministers took place, on 3 May, Ibrahim Sadr arrived in India. Sadr is the acting deputy minister of interior affairs of Afghanistan and is known for his past links with the Iranian Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which supported the Taliban breakaway faction headed by Sadr in 2020. He maintains good relations still with the Iranian security apparatus. Sadr is close to the Taliban’s supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and controls a good deal of the group’s security apparatus. Such a visit, even if unofficial, indicates a quiet recalibration by India in ties with Kabul, at a time of renewed tensions with Islamabad.
