In the wake of the U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran, it is widely argued that India is abandoning its balancing approach and tilting toward Israel and the United States. But this interpretation misses the real story. India’s strategic shift began well before the current crisis, and it points less to Israel than to the Gulf, particularly the UAE. What explains this deeper realignment in India’s Middle East strategy?
In the days following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel on 25 February and the U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian targets 48 hours later, much of the Indian media has converged around a familiar narrative. India, it is argued, is tilting decisively toward Israel and the United States, abandoning its long-held balancing approach towards the Middle East, and distancing itself from Iran. The apparent silence of New Delhi after the strikes has only reinforced this interpretation.
This reading, however, is both incomplete and misleading. It captures the optics of the moment but misses the deeper trajectory of India’s engagement with the region. The shift that observers are pointing to did not occur in the last two weeks. Nor is it primarily about Israel. If anything, the more consequential reorientation in India’s Middle East policy has been underway for over a decade—and it is directed not toward Tel Aviv or Washington, but toward the Gulf, and especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In fact, India’s evolving policies towards Israel or Iran over the last decade can be better understood through this lens of the rapprochement between India and the Gulf States.