North Korea is a difficult player to read in international affairs. It is dependent on China for economic sustenance, has a mutual defence agreement with Russia, deploys troops in Ukraine, threatens its neighbours with missile tests and engages with the West on occasion.
The newly inaugurated American president Donald Trump has already hinted that he might initiate talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un triggering a new phase of active American diplomacy in Korean affairs. India is preparing for a possible churn in regional politics as well. Delhi recently decided to restart its embassy in Pyongyang after the mission’s temporary closure in July 2021 owing to COVID-19.
Trump’s North Korea policy
President Trump, in his first term, initially adopted a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ on North Korea and brought measures such as the ‘secondary boycott,’ which meant penalising other countries and entities who traded with North Korea. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested to India during his visit in October 2017 that it cut off diplomatic ties with North Korea. India avoided the issue, saying that the ‘channel of communication’ with North Korea must be maintained. The Trump administration reportedly not only ‘understood’ and ‘appreciated’ the Indian stand but soon took a sharp turn, and Trump agreed to summit meetings with Kim.
Trump met the North Korean leader in Singapore in June 2018, and both sides took a few confidence-building moves. Both leaders met again in Hanoi in February 2019 with high expectations, but the summit abruptly ended as the U.S. wanted a promise from North Korea on substantial denuclearisation, and Pyongyang was demanding ‘corresponding measures’ from the U.S. The U.S. and North Korea have drifted away from each other since, though Trump tried to bring about a breakthrough by a sudden visit to Panmunjom in June 2019 and had his third meeting with Kim Jong-un. However, no further movement took place. The US administration under Joe Biden appeared passive in taking up the North Korean issue, and it has largely been a repeat of the Obama era’s ‘strategic patience’ policy.
North Korea, in the meantime, has been able to make substantial improvements in its nuclear and, more specifically, missile capabilities. It created a record for missile tests in a calendar year in 2022, and the U.S. administration remained a spectator.
The Biden administration has been considerate and engaging with regional allies such as Japan and South Korea, including a trilateral summit at Camp David in August 2023, but it has neglected advancements in the North Korean missile programme and the issue of its nuclear weapons.
Changed circumstances
North Korea has used the U.S.’s inaction, as well as the Ukraine crisis, to reach out to Russia and move out of isolation. The North Korean leader visited Russia in September 2023, and Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in June 2024. During Putin’s visit to Pyongyang, both countries signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement which included a mutual defence treaty. North Korea has also been supplying artillery and troops to Russia in its war in Ukraine, and Russia, in return, has helped North Korea to launch a military satellite as well as providing other technological assistance.
Trump is expected to have a proactive policy towards North Korea. That policy may be aggressive or adopt a mode of engagement but would not be passive and reactive as it has been during the Biden period.
It must also be underlined that Trump is also expected to recalibrate the U.S. policy towards China and Russia, and his moves towards North Korea would be located in this context. Trump will likely approach U.S. foes and friends with his ‘transactional’ approach. He may try to decrease U.S. support for Ukraine, make a deal with Russia, and try to be strict with China, but he may try to reach out to North Korea to make China uncomfortable.
Trump is expected to have a proactive policy towards North Korea. That policy may be aggressive or adopt a mode of engagement but would not be passive and reactive as it has been during the Biden period
While anticipating Trump’s approach, it must be kept in mind that Trump did not initiate engagement with North Korea in 2018 on his own. It was the South Korean President Moon Jae-in who brought the U.S. and North Korean leaders to the negotiating table. The current South Korean administration has quite a different approach towards North Korea, and the current President, Yoon Suk-yeol, is going through an impeachment process and is unlikely to survive in power beyond a few more months. The Trump administration would not thus have enough preparatory support from South Korea if it thinks of reaching out to North Korea again. Also, since North Korea has bad memories of the Hanoi summit and now appears to be less isolated, it would not be easy for the U.S. to expect an opening despite Trump’s proactive, out-of-the-box approach.
India’s possible role in Korean Affairs
India may be able to play the role of catalyst in the current context. As a global affairs peacemaker, India must proactively offer its constructive moves to contesting parties. Delhi may bring something new that regional actors are not able to do, as India enjoys good relations with both countries on the peninsula. India may not try only to connect the U.S. and North Korea but also consult with South Korea and Japan as both countries are close partners of India in the region. India’s restart with North Korea would also be strategically calibrated with New Delhi’s China policy, as North Korea has close relations with China.
India at present has the unique distinction of having good relations with the U.S., Japan, South Korea and Russia, along with maintaining continuous diplomatic relations with North Korea since 1974. With India’s growing stature and constructive engagements in foreign policy across the regions, the Trump administration would be interested in using India’s good offices to find out any possibility of reconciliation in Korean affairs.
It must be underlined that under the Biden administration, the U.S. allies in East Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, have definitely got closer and coordinated, but simultaneously, its adversaries, such as China, North Korea, Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and Iran, have also got close to one another. If the Trump administration realises this shortcoming of the Biden administration, it may find India’s approach of bridging the gap, seeking accommodation and reaching out to the other side of the aisle more pragmatic.
India at present has the unique distinction of having good relations with the U.S., Japan, South Korea and Russia, along with maintaining continuous diplomatic relations with North Korea since 1974. With India’s growing stature and constructive engagements in foreign policy across the regions, the Trump administration would be interested in using India’s good offices to find out any possibility of reconciliation in Korean affairs
Trump remains an unpredictable leader, and thus, the deadlock in Korean affairs may continue. In such a scenario, India would not have much space to contribute positively to the process. However, restarting the Indian embassy in Pyongyang is a good step in managing whatever changes a second Trump administration brings.
