In 2003, visiting Beijing, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared that India and China had “emerged decisively from this dead-end of mistrust,” and that “the combined strength and complementarity of an India-China partnership” was undeniable. A few months later, in the United States, he cited the “irrefutable logic of the India-U.S. partnership,” outlining the burgeoning defence and security, economic, science and technology, education, and people-to-people ties.
Much has changed since that time, but then and now (and arguably always), Indian policymakers have recognized that China and the U.S. are among the most—if not the most—consequential countries for India’s interests. They have thought about how China (the near behemoth) and the U.S. (the far behemoth) could and would affect, in both, positive or negative ways, India’s quest for security, prosperity, status and autonomy.
The roles Indian leaders have envisioned for Beijing and for Washington in their strategy have neither been static nor de-linked from each other. The roles China and the U.S. have ended up playing have depended on several factors, including the dynamics between them that affected their view of India. That, in turn, has shaped New Delhi’s options as it sought to achieve its objectives.
