Alicia R. Chen, in “Strategies of a Rising Power: Chinese Economic Influence in Regional International Organizations” (Journal of Contemporary China, 2025), investigates how China has leveraged its economic strength to shape regional international organisations (RIOs). Chen’s central thesis is that China’s behaviour in these institutions cannot be understood through the simple dichotomy of accommodation versus resistance, that is, the basic choice states face in power transitions: whether to resist a rising rival through confrontation or to accommodate it through negotiation and concessions. Instead, China pursues a pragmatic strategy of influence that is adaptive, layered, and context-specific. Chen demonstrates how Beijing uses economic power not only to advance its material interests but also to embed new norms and practices within regional multilateralism.
Chen begins by locating her argument within debates on rising powers and institutional orders. Classical power transition theory often assumes that rising states will either challenge existing institutions by creating alternatives or integrate into them by conforming to prevailing rules. Chen argues that China’s behaviour points to a more nuanced pathway. Beijing uses them as platforms to project influence, frame norms, and secure legitimacy for its economic agenda. This approach, she suggests, reflects China’s broader foreign policy style: avoiding direct confrontation with established powers while gradually shifting the institutional terrain in its favour.
Chen illustrates her argument through three cases that reveal different modes of Chinese engagement. In ASEAN, Beijing has deepened trade relations, expanded infrastructure financing, and positioned itself as the organisation’s most important economic partner. Yet, ASEAN also remains a site of tension, particularly over the South China Sea. Rather than seeking outright dominance, Chen argues that China ties economic incentives to political outcomes, cultivating select member states in ways that fragment collective resistance and prevent a unified stance against its maritime claims. A similar logic of adaptation appears in the SCO, which was originally conceived as a security body but has since broadened its scope to include economic cooperation. Here, Chen highlights how Beijing has promoted connectivity and development projects, repurposing the organisation’s agenda through institutional entrepreneurship while navigating Russia’s countervailing influence.
The AIIB illustrates yet another mode of engagement. Unlike ASEAN or the SCO, the AIIB was initiated by China itself, though it was framed as a multilateral institution open to global participation. Chen highlights how the AIIB embodies both continuity and innovation. On the one hand, it adopts familiar governance practices, which help reassure members about transparency and standards. On the other hand, its design grants China greater agenda-setting power, enabling it to channel funds toward projects that align with its strategic priorities. By balancing inclusivity with control, Beijing has positioned the AIIB as a credible alternative to Western-dominated financial institutions, while still benefiting from the legitimacy of multilateralism.
Across these cases, Chen identifies three primary mechanisms of influence. The first is financial leverage, where China uses loans, investment, and aid to shape preferences and behaviours within RIOs. The second is institutional entrepreneurship, through which Beijing introduces new norms, rules, and practices that reflect its developmental and governance models. The third is narrative framing, which allows China to present its actions as cooperative and mutually beneficial, even when underlying power asymmetries remain. Together, these mechanisms show how economic statecraft is translated into institutional influence, enabling Beijing to recalibrate rather than replace the regional order.
Chen concludes that the study of China’s rise requires moving beyond narratives of global rivalry to examine the institutional sites where influence is embedded and contested. For her, RIOs are not peripheral but central arenas in which China advances its interests. They provide Beijing with opportunities to align its economic statecraft with institutional legitimacy, creating a hybrid form of influence that blends material resources with normative framing. This does not mean that China seeks to overturn the existing order outright, but that it aims to reshape it gradually from within.
For scholars and policymakers, the lesson is clear: China’s rise is as much about the reshaping of regional institutions as it is about global competition.