Hsin-Hsin Pan, Scott L. Kastner, and Margaret M. Pearson, in “Is China-Taiwan Rapprochement Possible? Experimental Evidence from Taiwan” (Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2025), explore an often-overlooked question in debates on the Taiwan Strait: not how war might break out, but under what conditions peace could actually be negotiated. Their study shifts the focus from elite-level bargaining to ordinary Taiwanese citizens, asking what combinations of concessions from both sides could secure majority support for a Cross-Strait agreement.
The authors situate their inquiry in the current climate of rising tension. Beijing’s military activity near Taiwan and increasingly uncompromising rhetoric, amplified after the 2022 Pelosi visit and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have made conflict seem more imminent. Yet, the authors shift focus to examining the possibility of rapprochement and the domestic political limits that shape it. Since Taiwan is a democracy, public opinion plays a decisive role in determining whether any bargain is politically viable.
To probe these limits, the authors fielded a conjoint experiment in April 2022 with a representative sample of 2,905 Taiwanese citizens. Respondents were presented with hypothetical peace agreements composed of different concessions. On Taiwan’s side, these included pledging not to declare independence, recognising that both sides belong to “one China,” reducing arms procurement from the United States, or easing restrictions on Chinese investment. On Beijing’s side, concessions included pledging not to use force, reducing military activity such as flights or missiles, supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organisations like the WHO, or increasing imports from Taiwan. By comparing how support changed across these combinations, the authors were able to assess which concessions mattered most.
The results reveal sharp asymmetries. Taiwanese respondents strongly opposed sovereignty-related concessions, particularly renouncing independence or affirming “one China.” These produced large declines in support. Security-related concessions, such as reducing arms purchases from the U.S., also lowered support, though less dramatically. By contrast, Chinese concessions on sovereignty and security, especially a pledge not to use force or a reduction in military pressure, significantly increased support. Offers of greater economic exchange, from either side, had little effect.
What the study found most surprising was that outside powers had very little sway over Taiwanese opinion. Even if the United States openly backed an agreement, it did not make Taiwanese respondents more likely to support it; in fact, U.S. endorsement sometimes made them slightly less supportive. This shows that people in Taiwan care more about protecting their sovereignty and security than about aligning with Washington’s preferences. On the other side, China’s threats to attack if no deal was reached also failed to convince people. Most Taiwanese simply did not believe that Beijing’s threats or promises were credible.
The survey also asked about perceptions of war risk. Respondents estimated the likelihood of a Chinese attack at about 30% if Taiwan accepted an agreement, compared to 45% if it rejected one. This gap indicates that agreements were seen as somewhat stabilising, especially when Taiwan made sovereignty-related concessions. Yet Chinese promises did little to reduce doubts about Beijing’s long-term intentions, reflecting lessons drawn from Hong Kong and past broken commitments.
Taken together, these findings suggest that rapprochement is possible but tightly constrained. Agreements that combine meaningful Chinese concessions with only limited Taiwanese compromises can attract majority support. But a sizable minority rejected even the most favourable deals, indicating a durable base of resistance. In practical terms, any Taiwanese leader seeking a settlement must navigate these public opinion boundaries, which leave little room for dramatic concessions.
For Pan, Kastner, and Pearson, the broader significance of the study lies in its contribution to the study of “preemptive peace agreements”: frameworks negotiated to prevent rather than end war. Their results demonstrate how commitment problems, credibility gaps, and democratic accountability intersect to define the space for peace. Rather than assuming public opinion is either pliant or intransigent, the authors show that Taiwanese preferences are conditional, nuanced, and deeply rooted in questions of sovereignty and security.
At a time when the Taiwan Strait is widely described as the world’s most dangerous flashpoint, this article provides an important reminder. While the pathway to rapprochement is narrow, it does exist, but only if Beijing is willing to make credible concessions on sovereignty and security, and only if Taiwanese leaders can frame an agreement in ways that align with their citizens’ preferences. The limits are real, but so is the possibility.