The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)—signed in 1960 with World Bank mediation—has long been held up as a model of resilient diplomacy. It is one of the few agreements between India and Pakistan to survive wars, political ruptures, and prolonged diplomatic silences. However, in the wake of a devastating terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025—carried out by The Resistance Front, a Pakistan-based group that emerged in 2019 and is considered an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal—India formally suspended the treaty after the attack resulted in the death of twenty-six people.
Calling Pakistan’s continued support for cross-border terror a material breach, New Delhi announced that the IWT would remain in abeyance—a temporary suspension of the treaty’s implementation—until Islamabad “credibly and irrevocably” abjures terrorism. Although this marks the treaty’s first formal suspension, India had already issued multiple notices in 2023 seeking amendments to the treaty’s framework, citing procedural concerns and shifting geopolitical realities.
What is the Indus Waters Treaty?
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), brokered by the World Bank, divides the waters of the Indus river system between India and Pakistan. It allocates the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, with provisions allowing India limited non-consumptive use of the western rivers. Designed as a technocratic framework insulated from political volatility, the treaty also established the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) as its coordinating mechanism.
While the IWT has long been regarded as a cornerstone of transboundary water cooperation, it has encountered tensions in recent years. Disputes over India’s Kishanganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects—located on Pakistan’s western rivers—have highlighted divergent interpretations of treaty provisions, especially regarding design parameters.
The issue escalated when Pakistan bypassed the Neutral Expert mechanism—an initial technical dispute resolution process supported by the World Bank—and proceeded directly to arbitration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. India objected, arguing that this move violated the treaty’s dispute resolution framework, which mandates a sequential escalation from technical mediation to legal arbitration.
This deviation from the prescribed mechanism has not only complicated the ongoing disputes but has also spurred India to advocate for reforms to the IWT, including updates to its dispute resolution mechanisms to avoid parallel processes that could undermine the treaty’s integrity.
For context, The Kishanganga arbitration resulted in a PCA ruling in December 2013 that allowed India to proceed with the project, but with stipulations to maintain a minimum downstream water flow to Pakistan. This ruling set a key precedent in balancing developmental goals with downstream obligations.
Pakistan’s Response: A Diplomatic and Legal Counteroffensive
Islamabad’s reaction to India’s suspension of the IWT was unyielding and it “vehemently rejects” India’s suspension. In a statement issued by the Prime Minister’s Office, Pakistan condemned the move as an “act of war,” framing it as a deliberate violation of international norms and a direct threat to regional stability. In retaliation, Pakistan closed its airspace, suspended trade with India and announced the suspension of the 1972 Simla Agreement, thereby escalating the diplomatic crisis beyond the domain of water-sharing arrangements. Stressing the centrality of the Indus basin to its agricultural and energy security, Islamabad warned that India’s actions could have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. While signaling an intent to mobilise international opinion, Pakistan faces an uphill battle: experts note that securing third-party intervention will be difficult without Indian cooperation, particularly given prevailing global concerns over Pakistan’s record on cross-border terrorism.
Can India Suspend the Indus Waters Treaty? Legal and Strategic Dimensions
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) cannot be altered or terminated unilaterally. Article XII explicitly states that any modification to the treaty must be made through a “duly ratified treaty” concluded between the two governments. India’s recent use of the term “hold in abeyance” in its communication to Pakistan is notable. International law, particularly the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), does not recognise the concept of “abeyance” (state of temporary inactivity) that India used but it does allow for suspension of treaties under certain conditions. Although India is not formally a party to the VCLT and Pakistan has signed but not ratified it, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ruled that key provisions in Article 62, regarding “fundamental change of circumstances,” reflect binding customary international law.
Implications for Pakistan
India’s suspension of the IWT presents significant challenges for Pakistan, a nation heavily reliant on the Indus River system, which accounts for over 80% of its irrigated agriculture and a substantial portion of its hydropower generation. The cessation of water flow data sharing from India severely hampers Pakistan’s ability to manage its water resources, increasing the risk of both flooding and drought due to unforeseen water releases. India’s newfound autonomy over the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—enables it to pursue hydroelectric projects and water storage initiatives without prior consultation with Pakistan, which could disrupt downstream water availability. Pakistan’s chronic lack of adequate water management infrastructure, including insufficient storage and inefficient canal systems, leaves it vulnerable to these disruptions. This exacerbates its challenges in addressing water scarcity, threatening food security, agricultural productivity, and energy generation. The suspension not only deepens Pakistan’s vulnerability but also heightens geopolitical tensions in the region.
The suspension of the IWT marks a significant moment in India-Pakistan relations, illustrating the complex balance between diplomacy, security concerns, and shared resources. India’s decision reflects the growing tension over cross-border terrorism, yet it also brings to light the vulnerabilities of long-standing agreements in the face of shifting geopolitical realities. Dr. Happymon Jacob suggests that ‘India’s actions, such as placing the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, closing the Attari border crossing, expelling Pakistani defense and military advisors, and withdrawing its own attaches from Pakistan, are non-military measures aimed at exerting pressure without escalating to direct military confrontation.”
The IWT, originally designed to foster cooperation over water resources, now finds itself entangled in broader political dynamics. While the move responds to the Pahalgam attack, it raises the question of who bears the greatest consequences of this action, and whether such measures fully consider the broader ethical implications for those whose livelihoods depend on these shared resources.
