Among the truisms that dominate discourse in the foreign policy world, this might be the one that most exercises minds in New Delhi: that India and China will either stumble into conflict or they will manage to engage in mutual cooperation through mutual understanding and dialogue. Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, the two Asian giants will engage in managed competition over security and influence while cooperating on issues where such cooperation is feasible. Geopolitical factors, economic heft as well as bilateral military balance, will play key roles in determining which path the relationship takes. Hence, most analyses on the contemporary ‘abnormal’ relationship rightly focuses on these factors.
Yet there is another variable, albeit one more hidden from the forefront as well as insufficiently dissected by analysts, that will play a crucial role going forward: the prospect of a package deal between India and China and the ability of Indian democracy to come to terms with the same.
There is precedent for this. Over the last few years, there has been a growing consensus that the 1960 package deal on the border offered by China—namely, India’s recognition of China’s control over Aksai Chin in exchange for China’s acceptance of Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory—was a missed opportunity. India’s national interests required Delhi to accept such an offer. It was a combination of domestic political constraints faced by Prime Minister Nehru, mistrust towards China as well as concerns over acquiring a reputation of weakness that led India to reject the offer and replace it with the forward policy subsequently.
