Biden administration ensures that Trump 2.0 has the toolkit to strengthen strategic ties with India.
Interview with Rakesh Sood, former Indian diplomat and Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, on U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s visit to New Delhi.
In his final visit to India as the U.S. National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan provided a long-awaited assurance to give a push to bilateral nuclear cooperation—the delisting of key Indian nuclear entities. Sources indicate that these could include the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), and the Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL). While this move signals progress, challenges remain—ranging from legal frameworks to geopolitical considerations—that will shape the future of the strategic technology partnership.
In this interview, we explore Ambassador Rakesh Sood’s insights on these latest developments and the broader implications of the India-U.S. Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) in strengthening India-U.S. ties.
Hely Desai: What do you make of the outgoing National Security Advisor (NSA) Jake Sullivan’s visit to New Delhi and his announcement on lifting restrictions, just two weeks before President Trump’s inauguration? Additionally, with the External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar meeting both the outgoing and incoming U.S. NSAs and Secretaries of State ahead of the curbs being lifted, what significance do you attach to the timing and context of these diplomatic engagements?
Rakesh Sood: The iCET is a Biden Administration initiative. It is ambitious and wide-ranging in scope—covering multiple technologies, involving businesses and academic institutions in both countries. Launched in May 2022, by President Joe Biden and PM Narendra Modi, two meetings at the level of NSAs have taken place in January 2023 and June 2024, together with multiple other rounds of discussion. However, there is still a lot of work to be done.
I believe that the Biden administration wanted to define this initiative, by registering some final achievements, so that iCET could then be handed over to the incoming Trump administration. India-U.S. relations have enjoyed a positive trajectory reflecting continuity—from the Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. I see the Sullivan visit as a capstone visit, which underlines the key objectives and achievements so far, and if it has drawn out the next steps, it becomes a useful hand-over to the incoming Trump administration officials. We know that India’s Foreign Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, was also in Washington last month in December, where he met with both the outgoing NSA, Jake Sullivan and the incoming NSA appointee, Mike Waltz.
So, there would have been an element of explaining the new developments regarding the initiative, thereby ensuring quick follow-up. Clearly, the Biden administration views the iCET initiative as a key pillar in the evolution of India-U.S. relations and aims to ensure that this legacy continues under the new administration.
Before we dive into the latest developments, it would be useful to set the context by understanding the broader trajectory of the U.S.-India strategic engagement over the years—particularly in defence, technology, and the complexities around export controls. Could you walk us through how the iCET initiative fits into this evolving framework of cooperation over time?
You are right; the iCET must be seen from a historical perspective. We have consistently engaged with the U.S. despite various ups and downs since the 1990s. After the 1998 nuclear tests, dialogues between India and the U.S. intensified to understand better and appreciate each other’s security and economic imperatives. This led to the establishment of the U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) in 2002, aimed at addressing obstacles related to U.S. export controls, given India’s non-membership to ad hoc export control regimes. Parallel dialogues ultimately culminated in the landmark 2008 Civilian Nuclear 123 agreement, which helped resolve long-standing issues. In parallel, defence cooperation was initiated with joint exercises and purchases of U.S. platforms. To give a greater impetus, the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) was launched in 2012.
However, obstacles remained, leading to the 2018 Strategic Trade Authorization Category I agreement. Meanwhile, a host of other enabling agreements, including—the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), the Industrial Security Annex (ISA), and the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA)— were signed. These agreements have been part of a continuous trend in U.S.-India relations since the turn of the century, and the iCET initiative is a natural next step that seeks to elevate and expand our strategic defence partnership and defence industrial cooperation.
In light of the Biden administration’s special efforts to deepen bilateral advanced technology cooperation and the recent lifting of certain restrictions, there remains a significant disparity between the U.S. and India in R&D funding. How does the iCET initiative seek to bridge the gap between government, industry, and academia in both countries to foster collaboration?
Since iCET involves governments, businesses, and academia in both countries, a mapping must be found between the three; government being the easiest due to its administrative structure of mapping the Executive Office with the PMO and placing the NSAs in charge. However, the gap is larger when it comes to business and industry. India’s total R&D, both government and non-government, is approx. $17 billion annually, with nearly 80% from government sources, whereas U.S. R&D totals about $800 billion, with three-quarters coming from the private sector. Since the U.S. private sector is conducting cutting-edge research, intellectual property rests with it. Consequently, the U.S. government cannot compel the private sector to share proprietary technology. Therefore, governments can help businesses find ways to collaborate, advance their R&D, and support startups. This is why iCET has focused on initiatives like INDUS-X that bring together defence-related startups, and similar efforts are now beginning in the space sector.
Coming to academia, our universities aren’t conducting much cutting-edge research; this is primarily carried out by laboratories under the Department of Science and Technology, the Department of Space, and similar bodies. In the U.S., such research is mainly led by academic institutions and projects are funded by the National Science Foundation. Converting pure research into practical technologies is left to the private sector. Thus, when mapping these three sectors, we must find ways to align them to achieve tangible outcomes, as they operate on different scales.
Since iCET involves governments, businesses, and academia in both countries, a mapping must be found between the three; government being the easiest due to its administrative structure of mapping the Executive Office with the PMO and placing the NSAs in charge.
Given these challenges, as the U.S. lifts curbs on restricted entities to foster greater collaboration, how might India’s domestic regulations, such as the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, still hinder progress? Additionally, with obstacles like the 10CFR810 authorisation in place, is there a way to navigate or overcome these hurdles?
While you mention just two, there are a host of other legislations to add to these hindrances— certain aspects in our tax and investment rules and labour laws, to name a few—which could delay or hinder joint ventures and will need to be addressed and resolved. Our experience with HTCG and DTTI has shown us some of the obstacles relating to U.S. export controls. When speaking of the 10CFR810 authorisation particularly, it governs the exchange of sensitive technology information, even during talks or negotiations. For instance, if a U.S. entity like Advanced Maritime collaborates with Bharat Dynamics to produce sonobuoys, this would likely involve exchanges of sensitive technology and information, especially since the manufacturing would take place in India.
So, the question is whether these waivers would only be granted on a case-by-case basis or if broader exemption waivers could be considered. The AUKUS agreement (between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S.) involves the transfer of sensitive technologies for nuclear-powered submarines. Since Australia and the U.K. are long-standing U.S. allies and partners in the Five Eyes, I believe they benefit from a blanket waiver, avoiding a step-by-step process.
Similarly, in the case of iCET, we keep identifying the hurdles as we move forward, and these challenges on both sides will need to be addressed.
So if such obstacles still persist despite the lifting of certain trade restrictions on select Indian entities, with the impending transition to a Trump administration— what measures can be taken to ensure a smooth continuity in the approach to technology development, regardless of potential shifts in policy?
A closer India-U.S. partnership, as envisaged under iCET, is not inconsistent with Trump’s idea of Make in America or MAGA. Trump is keen on strengthening the U.S. economy, and manufacturing certain items through trusted sources fits within that vision. In telecom, for instance, we focus on trusted partnerships and sourcing equipment from reliable providers. The iCET initiative aims to address vulnerabilities and dependencies across value chains, whether for semiconductors, defence items, or pharmaceuticals.
However, then, is it too far-fetched to say that the remnant of these obstacles as cooperation further deepens may inadvertently lead to an increasing reliance on U.S. technology, potentially overshadowing India’s own technological independence and capabilities?
Yesterday, I was listening to Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh delivering the Subroto Mukherjee lecture, where he mentioned that the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project began in 1984, with the first flight of the Tejas in 2001. The first order for 40 aircraft was placed in 2015, yet in 2025, the delivery is still pending. He remarked, “Technology delayed is technology denied.” I think it is good to remember this while worrying today about ‘dependence’.
How can the iCET framework not only facilitate the successful implementation of these relaxations, but also ensure sustained, measurable progress in U.S.-India cooperation, while effectively managing challenges like institutional inertia and the shifting contours of global geopolitics?
To ensure momentum under iCET, we need to define specific goalposts in some of the technology sectors. For instance, after the nuclear tests, it was clear that civilian nuclear cooperation was the goal, and both countries worked together to remove the bottlenecks. The negotiation took ten years, starting right after the 1998 nuclear tests, with outcomes being delivered in 2008. Since then, we have been seeking new areas to demonstrate progress.
It is, therefore, important for successful fruition of the iCET that we identify specific projects in each sector—defence, space, biotech, AI, quantum, semiconductors—set clear timelines, and monitor progress to prevent loss of momentum and avoid the failure fatigue setting in. This is critical to make iCET a success.
