As we step into 2026, I wish to share some personal reflections on four priorities India must focus on this year. In a world that is increasingly transforming, fragmented, and needlessly hostile, and where “polycrisis” is the permanent state of affairs, nations must set clear policy goals and pursue them with determination.
Policy priorities are like New Year resolutions—it’s good to make them, it’s good to keep reminding yourself of them, and perhaps feel bad if you don’t stick to them. If you don’t have them, you aren’t just drifting along without a map; you are allowing the storm to decide your destination for you. Individuals can afford to do that (maybe), but countries cannot. Definitely not big countries.
There is another reason countries must have priorities in the conduct of their foreign policy: if we don’t set out our own priorities, someone else will set them for us, or external forces and developments will define them for us. We are too big, and too proud, to be followers of someone else’s priorities. So let’s set our own.
When too many things go on around us in the world, people—people like us—can easily succumb to the temptation of reacting to every headline. So my purpose behind this opening essay for India’s World is to think beyond the noise. I spent some time thinking about the state of our foreign policy, weighing a number of complex and consequential challenges—from border tensions to digital currency shifts—and decided to pick four specific priority challenges.
The following were chosen as priority areas not because they reflect the only issues contemporary India faces (there are far too many, of course), but because they are, in my view, structural hinges of India’s trajectory as a major power in this decade and beyond.
Space as a Strategic Domain
As space becomes one of the most definitive domains of global commerce, conflict, and rule-making, India must transition from being a service provider to foreign powers to a consequential space power in its own right. It is time to move beyond the romance of the Chandrayaan and focus on the hard realities of the marketplace and the battlefield that space is becoming.
Let’s do a little reality check. The good news is that we have liberalised our space policy, reduced decades-old monopoly of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in space matters, and allowed the private sector to join the party. As a matter of fact, the Indian Space Policy 2023 was an important policy shift, decoupling ISRO from manufacturing so that it can focus on R&D, while empowering Non-Government Entities through IN-SPACe and NSIL. When read alongside the 2024 liberalisation of 100% FDI in satellite components, the government’s intent was clear—it meant to let more fresh air into the once-dormant space sector. However, as of today in 2026, those good intentions have not led to much on the ground.
I have chosen these four specific priorities for a simple reason: they represent the structural hinges of India’s national power for years to come.
IN-SPACe, as is well known, still lacks “legislative teeth,” thereby leaving long-term investors wary of potential policy flip-flops, which, of course, are not unheard of. Investment requires certainty, which our space policy doesn’t provide. More significantly, there exists a serious gap in the country’s launch capacity. While our heavy-duty PSLV and LVM3 rockets are reliable, in the age of SpaceX, the name of the game is launch frequency. For instance, if an Indian private firm wishes to launch satellites on a weekly basis, our current infrastructure simply cannot support it.
The Status Quo Is Costly
The costs of such policy inertia are evident. For a country that is considered to be one of the top five space powers, India currently holds a mere 2% of the $400 billion-plus global space economy. Without radical and immediate policy changes, India’s target of going from 2% to 10% by 2033, in an economy that is expected to grow to $1.8 trillion by 2035, will remain a vision on paper.
We are also staring at a brain drain in space, as our brightest engineers flee to Western firms that offer the investment, policy and physical infrastructure that we are unable to provide. Even Singapore is home to a large number of Indian space companies. It is not just a question of commercial benefits—in an age where satellites and anti-satellite technologies are essential tools of modern warfare, our inability to replace a satellite within 48 hours will also constitute a national security challenge.
Surely, governments are not typically known for making rapid technological innovations in the way private firms do. However, for private firms to thrive, governments must establish the necessary policy, legal and infrastructure ecosystem.
Consider this: why can’t an Indian startup build a private “Starbase” (akin to SpaceX’s industrial complex and launch site in the United States)? Part of the answer is in the “Sovereignty and Liability Trap.” Under the 1972 UN Liability Convention, the launching state is legally responsible for any private mission failure—a challenge SpaceX addresses by operating under the legal umbrella of the U.S. government. Then there are the security clearances required for dual-use rocket technology (which, again, SpaceX manages through rigorous government security protocols). Finally, India maintains a 49% FDI cap on launch vehicles, which makes private-only infrastructure difficult.
Here’s what I propose we should do in 2026 to empower our Space sector:
- The government must urgently back the space policy with legislative teeth.
- Incentivise the manufacturing of space hardware through a dedicated Space PLI Scheme, something the industry has long demanded.
- Create a multi-billion-dollar government-backed venture capital fund to support space startups.
- Consider creating Special Space Economic Zones where launchpads are leased and operated by private firms—something private firms would not be able to do on their own.
Let’s be clear: in today’s world, the distinction between commercial space and national defence has disappeared, and our space policy must now reflect that reality in 2026. India can’t afford to lose the space race.
Trade Realism and the CPTPP
When the Modi government took office in 2014, it inherited a series of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN, Japan, and Korea, which many within and outside the government believed posed serious challenges to Indian manufacturing. As a result, the FTAs were paused. It was decided to review existing pacts to correct trade deficits, and the process went on for almost seven years.
However, in 2021, the government woke up to the new realities unfolding around it and made a complete 180-degree turn. India aggressively restarted its foreign trade engine, negotiating and concluding trade deals with the UAE and Australia, followed by the UK (CETA) and the European Free Trade Association in 2024-25, and the ones with the US and EU are currently being negotiated.
Why do I think there is a need to press the accelerator on this? Because the era of multilateralism is more or less over. The World Trade Organization stands paralysed, tech wars and tariffs are on the rise, and protectionism is back in fashion. In such a world, WTO’s “most-favoured-nation” principle is passé; what really matters is the “trusted-partner” principle. If so, regional and bilateral FTAs are now the way to ensure plug-and-play access to global value chains and trade flows. India must utilise them.
India’s 2019 exit from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was perhaps an understandable attempt at risk management, as joining RCEP would have granted China virtually duty-free access to Indian markets, potentially decimating India’s MSMEs, as several economists have argued. Instead of joining the RCEP, India took a rather circuitous route and created a “RCEP-minus-China” outcome by signing bilateral FTAs with 14 of the 15 RCEP countries.
However, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a very different beast altogether, and India must consider it more favourably. Unlike the RCEP, the CPTPP includes 12 nations but notably excludes China. The single most important benefit is this: by joining CPTPP, India could be better positioned to capitalise on the “China Plus One” strategy as multinational firms look to diversify away from China.
So in 2026, the question is not if India should open up its markets, but for whom; and not if India should join regional trading agreements, but which. Choosing the CPTPP would be an act of trade realism, to secure our markets, attract high-tech FDI, and keep the rival at arm’s length. If India wants to be a global power, it must embrace healthy and friendly economic competition more confidently.
Become a Neutral Pole in World Politics
In 2026, the world no longer operates in binary camps, at least not yet. Once a uniquely Indian foreign policy choice, today the whole world appears to embrace multi-alignment. When India assumes the BRICS Chairpersonship this year, it faces an important foreign policy test: leading a bloc that is in the eye of the American storm, and that includes its greatest challenge, its oldest and till date most reliable strategic partner, and a group of nations wary of Western hegemony.
While the West often views BRICS as an “anti-Western” alliance, India’s presence actually ensures that it remains a “non-Western” group, and not an “anti-Western” alliance. When it chairs BRICS this year, India has the opportunity to send a clear message to Washington: New Delhi will decide the nature of its strategic partnerships. It will also give New Delhi an opportunity to rally the grouping around issues dear to the Global South agenda—debt relief, climate finance, and digital public infrastructure, among others.
The 2026 Chairmanship provides India with a unique set of geopolitical levers, should it decide to instrumentalise them:
- Restraining China: Within the BRICS framework, India could push for a consensus-based expansion and local currency trade, rather than support attempts to promote yuan-based trade or Chinese payment mechanisms. In doing so, India can prevent the BRICS from becoming an instrument of the Chinese geopolitical agenda.
- Keeping Russia in Play: In a world where Moscow is increasingly isolated by the G7, India’s engagement through BRICS ensures Russia doesn’t become a vassal state of China. The more the world isolates Russia, the more India should engage it, so that it comes less under Chinese influence.
- Messaging America: By hosting the 2026 Summit and pursuing a clear and consequential agenda, India has an opportunity to remind the US that its “Strategic Autonomy” is non-negotiable—that India can be a “Major Defence Partner” of the US and be a part of the Quad, while at the same time leading a group that seeks to reform the dollar-dominated financial system, among other things.
- Global South Leadership: In line with its 2023 G20 Presidency, India should consider highlighting issues important to the Global South, so as to keep an important, but often ignored, part of the international community proactively engaged.
In a chaotic world, India must attempt to be a neutral pole. Consider this: India is perhaps the only country that can talk to the Kremlin, negotiate with the White House (Trump’s shenanigans apart), and refuse to join the Chinese bandwagon. In 2026, therefore, New Delhi must use the BRICS Chairmanship to help write the new rules of an international order, from the Global South.
Secure Critical Minerals
In 2026, the single most important reality that India will face is this: without critical mineral security, its global competitiveness will dramatically shrink. To survive the coming chaos, India must take urgent measures to secure its critical minerals needs.
The importance of critical minerals security comes from the fact that the global economy is transitioning from “Big Oil” to “Big Minerals.” Today, be it semiconductor fabrication units, EV battery manufacturing, or the production of missiles, materials like lithium, cobalt, and other rare earths are indispensable. What makes this a national security challenge is the fact that China controls nearly 90% of the processing for many of these items. If India continues to remain a mere importer, its strategic autonomy will come under immense stress going forward. In 2026, the National Critical Mineral Mission should prioritise industrial-scale extraction of these critical minerals.
In fact, while India possesses substantial reserves of several key minerals, our mining technology is outdated. Therefore, it is essential for us to seek trusted partners who can provide the necessary technology. This is where India’s relationship with Japan becomes crucial. Implementing the 2025 India-Japan Resource Security Pact, India must negotiate for the import of Japanese precision mining and deep-sea extraction technology, among others. Japan’s expertise in environmentally responsible mining and high-purity refining will significantly enhance India’s capacity to explore and extract critical minerals, mitigating the environmental backlash that has stalled several of our mining projects for years.
India also possesses vast reserves of thorium, which has the potential to be a key critical mineral. Once again, to truly unlock our vast thorium reserves, we need foreign, but trusted, technology. Japan is, once again, a major potential partner here. If brought together, Indian thorium and Japanese technology could create energy solutions capable of running semiconductor fabs and green hydrogen plants. Thorium, of course, has other uses too as a critical mineral.
India must move beyond merely buying minerals to developing them and become an integral part of the supply chain. This, in turn, requires supply chain partnerships that are geopolitically insulated from threats. We must aggressively expand critical mineral alliances, moving beyond our current talks with Australia and Chile to become a leading force within groupings like the Mineral Security Partnership.
Why these four priorities?
As the Editor of a foreign policy magazine, I am frequently asked: “When every headline feels like an emergency, or yells like one, how do we choose where to look and what to pick?” My standard response is that we should look at the big picture. So I have chosen these four specific priorities for a simple reason: they represent the structural hinges of India’s national power for years to come.
Focusing on space and minerals will ensure that India is not held hostage by technology embargoes or resource weaponisation, both of which have become routine. BRICS Leadership will help India become a leader in a world increasingly short on visionary leaders. And the CPTPP is about economic realism and carefully pursuing India’s interests.
In the first decade of this century, the world spoke of India’s potential. Today, the conversation is no longer asks what India might do, but what India is doing, because what India does will have consequences for itself and the world. So we must make our strategic plan of action wisely and implement it resolutely.
Happy New Year from India’s World.
Happymon Jacob, Ph.D.
Editor, India’s World