The announcement of 50% tariffs on Indian goods and the continued ambiguity surrounding a US-Japan trade agreement pose a fundamental challenge to both New Delhi and Tokyo. India and Japan have to navigate an increasingly transactional US foreign policy under a Trump 2.0 administration while managing the pressing reality of China’s Indo-Pacific regional ascendancy. Both countries must chart a course that acknowledges three uncomfortable truths. First, that American unpredictability will persist beyond the Trump administration. Second, that neither India nor Japan possesses sufficient individual or collective capability to balance China without an American partnership. Third, that passive adherence to Washington’s preferences serves neither Tokyo nor New Delhi’s national interests nor regional stability. This piece argues that India and Japan must explore minilateral structures in Asia in their effort to manage the effects of American inconsistency.
The China Challenge is simple math
To return to the challenge at hand: The arithmetic of power in the Indo-Pacific presents a sobering picture for New Delhi and Tokyo. According to the Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2024, China commands a comprehensive power score of 72.7, significantly outpacing both Japan (38.9) and India (39.1). Even when combined, Japanese and Indian capabilities fall short of Chinese power projection. The Global Power Index by Pareto reinforces this assessment, positioning China’s military strength at 0.0706, while India and Japan register 0.1023 and 0.1601, respectively—lower scores indicating greater power. These indices underscore that China’s economic mass, military modernisation, and diplomatic influence have created an asymmetry that bilateral India-Japan cooperation alone cannot address.