In a paper titled ASEAN Goes BRICS by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, the Foundation brings together six authors to examine why ASEAN member countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are now also engaging with BRICS.
Krisna Gupta and Radityo Dharmaputra analyse Indonesia’s membership; Cheng-Chwee Kuik evaluates Malaysia’s bid; Pongphisoot Busbarat examines Thailand’s engagement interests; Nguyen Ngoc Manh explains Vietnam’s motivations; while Felix Jantz situates these cases within broader geopolitical and economic trends. The central argument remains: ASEAN engagement with BRICS is not a civilisational or ideological pivot away from the West, but a strategy of hedging, diversification and status-seeking in an increasingly polarised international order.
Across the chapters, the motivations converge despite differing national contexts. For instance, Gupta and Dharmaputra link Indonesia’s BRICS membership to President Prabowo Subianto’s ambition to elevate Indonesia’s global standing while diversifying economic partnerships. Kuik frames Malaysia’s BRICS bid under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim as both a hedge amid US–China rivalry and a tool of domestic political legitimation. Busbarat situates Thailand’s outreach within its long-standing “bamboo diplomacy,” aimed at restoring international visibility after years of foreign policy passivity. Nguyen underscores Vietnam’s emphasis on autonomy under its defence doctrine, diversification of development finance, and deeper Global South engagement. None of the authors interpret BRICS affiliation as alignment with China and Russia something that many in the West perceive BRICS to be; rather they describe it as expanding diplomatic options.
Analytically, the volume shows that BRICS’ appeal lies less in institutional strength and more in strategic flexibility. Simultaneously, all four states continue deep economic and security ties with Western partners. Indonesia and Thailand have pursued OECD engagement, while Vietnam and Malaysia remain deeply integrated into Western trade networks. BRICS therefore becomes a platform for risk management in an era of tariff weaponisation, supply-chain fragmentation and a platform to amplify the voice of the “Global South”.
The significance of the report lies in demonstrating that Southeast Asia is not “choosing sides,” but recalibrating in response to structural shifts in the global system. For Western partners, particularly Europe and Germany, the implication is not containment but competition through engagement—credible development finance, technology cooperation and market access. However, the emergence of defence-related BRICS cooperation, including China-led naval exercises such as “Will for Peace 2026,” signals that the trajectory of the grouping will matter. If BRICS evolves into a platform for military coordination among states confronting the West, Southeast Asian participation would acquire a different strategic meaning. For now, the region’s engagement reflects hedging, not alignment—but that distinction may become harder to sustain as global polarisation deepens.