Raja Menon, a retired Rear Admiral of the Indian Navy, argues that India’s emergence as a major power will depend heavily on its ability to think seriously about maritime strategy. In At the Dawn of a Naval Renaissance: India Takes a Relook at Mahan (Naval War College Review, Vol. 78, No. 2), he revisits Alfred Thayer Mahan not as a fixed doctrine to be copied, but as a way of understanding how trade, economic growth, geography, and naval strength shape long-term power. Menon’s central concern is how these ideas apply to India in a very different global and historical setting.
Menon places Mahan’s ideas in historical context by examining Britain’s rise between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. He accepts Mahan’s argument that control of the sea played a decisive role in Britain’s dominance. However, he corrects the standard account by showing that British naval power was sustained by massive economic extraction from India after the Battle of Plassey and the acquisition of diwani rights. British sea power mattered, but it was made far more effective by colonial revenues, labour, and resources drawn from India, a combination that cannot be repeated in today’s international system.
The article warns against applying historical models of sea power too directly to the present. Menon explains that modern global commerce operates through flags of convenience, complex ownership structures, multinational supply chains, and dense legal and environmental regulations. These conditions make commerce warfare far more complicated and riskier than in Mahan’s time. While navies still plan to protect or disrupt sea lines of communication, unrestricted attacks on trade now carry serious political, legal, and escalation risks. Submarines, blockades, and exclusion zones remain relevant tools, but their use is far more constrained.
Menon then evaluates claims that China is following a Mahanian path. He acknowledges the rapid growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and China’s heavy dependence on maritime trade. However, he argues that China’s naval strategy remains focused on nearby seas, Taiwan-related contingencies, and denying access to adversaries, rather than on global sea control. Chinese port projects and overseas facilities, especially in the Indian Ocean region, reflect dependence on the existing international order more than a clear attempt to dominate it. China’s geographic vulnerabilities, particularly at the Strait of Malacca, and its limited experience operating far from home waters further restrict its ability to pursue ocean-wide dominance in the near term.
For India, Menon presents maritime power as a strategic requirement rather than an optional ambition. India’s economic growth, growing reliance on seaborne trade, and favourable geographic position make the Indian Ocean central to its security and influence. Naval strength allows India to safeguard trade, respond to China’s expanding presence, shape regional outcomes, and compensate for its disadvantages along the Himalayan frontier. Initiatives such as Project Sagarmala are discussed as efforts to link port development, economic integration, and naval capability into a broader maritime approach.
Menon concludes that India’s naval renewal must be grounded in realism and historical awareness. Sea power remains crucial, but it now operates in a global environment shaped by technology, legitimacy, and cooperation as much as by fleet size. India’s goal is not dominance of the oceans in an imperial sense, but sustained regional sea control that supports trade, deters pressure from adversaries, and contributes to stability in the Indian Ocean. In this way, Mahan remains useful not as a predictor of outcomes, but as a tool for thinking carefully about power, geography, and strategy in a changing world.