In a research report titled India’s Grand Strategy and the U.S. Risk Equation published by the American Foreign Policy Council (2025) and authored by McCarthy Anum-Addo, the author examines India’s rapid rise as both an economic and strategic actor and the implications for U.S. policy. He argues that India is no longer a “natural ally” by default but a complex power that could replicate some of the same structural features that made China formidable—centralised control, strategic ambiguity, and technological sovereignty. This possibility, he argues, demands a shift from assumption-driven engagement to risk-managed convergence.
In the report, he traces the evolution of Indian strategic doctrine. At the time of independence, Jawaharlal Nehru rejected the Cold War bipolarity and led the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a moral and practical assertion of sovereignty. The 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union reflected a pragmatic deepening of ties, securing defence supplies and diplomatic support while allowing India to preserve its non-aligned posture. The 1991 economic crisis led to liberalisation and deeper ties with the United States, Israel and Southeast Asia, and the 2005 U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement signalled willingness to build long-term partnerships without compromising autonomy. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the doctrine has become aspirational and civilisational, projecting India as “Vishwaguru” and emphasising multi-alignment as a foundation of official policy.
The report presents India as a “sovereign synthesiser” rather than a swing state, actively borrowing tools from major powers while avoiding their traps. It buys over 45 per cent of its arms from Russia even as it co-develops defence systems with the U.S., France and Israel; it is a key partner of the Quad while leading the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); and it trades heavily with China even as it confronts Chinese troops at the border. This multi-vector hedging, Anum-Addo argues, is not confusion but control—an assertion of autonomy that turns partnerships into leverage.
Yet this strategy creates frictions with Washington. The report highlights India’s continued arms trade with Moscow, its data localisation and indigenous tech push, and ties with Iran as sources of U.S. concern. Anum-Addo asserts that this does not signal hostility but exposes the limits of assuming shared democracy equals shared direction. If the U.S. clings to rigid alliance logic while India prioritises manoeuvre, the result could be misalignment without adaptation.
In conclusion, Anum-Addo calls for a paradigm shift in U.S. strategy—away from pressure and toward calibrated influence through modular, issue-based partnerships that support Indian autonomy while shaping its evolution. This approach, he proposes, can be built around initiatives such as a Quantum and AI Governance Alliance, an Indo-Pacific Space Surveillance Fusion Centre, an India–Middle East Renewable Energy Corridor, a U.S.–India Smart Manufacturing Fund, and an Indo-Pacific Cyber Reserve Force. If designed well, such an approach could prevent India’s drift toward a “Sinoform” model and instead lay the foundations for a durable, pluralistic partnership shaping the Indo-Pacific’s future.