Zachary Burdette, in his article “The U.S. China Military Balance in Space: Implications for Future Warfare in the Pacific,” published in the Spring 2025 issue of International Security, provides a timely and methodologically sharp reassessment of the military importance of space in the evolving U.S.-China strategic competition. Departing from alarmist narratives of an impending “space Pearl Harbor,” Burdette offers a sober, analytically rigorous framework evaluating space power in terms of dependence—how much the U.S. military relies on satellites, and resilience—how well these systems can function if degraded or attacked by a capable adversary like China.
Burdette structures his analysis around a plausible future conflict: a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan. This, he argues, presents the most strategically significant and operationally demanding test of U.S. military power projection under Chinese counterspace threats. He focuses on three core missions the U.S. would need to perform: sinking Chinese troop transports en route to Taiwan, denying China air superiority, and conducting limited strikes on military infrastructure on the Chinese mainland.
Burdette’s findings challenge assumptions that space systems are a universal vulnerability or single point of failure. While satellites are crucial for certain missions—particularly for long-range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)—they are not equally critical across all operations. For anti-surface warfare, satellites are especially valuable. Detecting and tracking Chinese amphibious vessels across vast oceanic areas depends heavily on space-based ISR, especially given Chinese missile and air defences. However, Burdette notes these vessels must move through narrow, predictable corridors like the Taiwan Strait, making them vulnerable to a layered “sensing ecosystem” including satellites, aircraft, submarines, drones, and Taiwan’s land-based sensors.
For counter-air operations, U.S. forces are less dependent on space. Airborne warning systems, fighter sensors, and radar networks remain the primary sources of targeting and situational awareness. Satellites may offer broader operational context, but are not decisive in tactical air combat. For mainland strike missions, space dependence varies. Fixed targets like ports or runways can be attacked using pre-stored coordinates, requiring little satellite input. But mobile systems like missile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) demand dynamic ISR, a role ISR satellites are suited for. Even so, Burdette notes the difficulty of such missions: in the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. failed to destroy a single confirmed mobile Scud launcher, and China’s systems are more advanced and better protected.
On resilience, Burdette pushes back against claims that satellites are easily destroyed and irreplaceable. While acknowledging their vulnerability—due to fixed orbits, minimal defences, and advancing Chinese counterspace capabilities—he focuses on the strategic survivability of satellite constellations. The shift toward proliferated constellations—large numbers of small satellites in distributed orbits—makes them harder to comprehensively degrade. These systems typically degrade gradually, enabling continued, if reduced, support to military operations. The expanding U.S. commercial space sector adds redundancy through rapid launches and alternative data streams.
Burdette also addresses concerns over the fragility of satellite-enabled communications and precision guidance. He shows how high-altitude relays, tactical data links, unmanned aerial nodes, and inertial navigation have created overlapping capabilities. Even if satellites are lost, weapons can strike targets using pre-programmed coordinates, inertial guidance, or emerging tools like quantum sensors and celestial navigation. While accuracy and tempo may suffer, overall warfighting capacity would likely remain intact, particularly in a limited-duration conflict.
Still, Burdette’s optimism is tempered by two caveats. First, resilience is not automatic; it hinges on sustained investment in robust architectures, diverse launch options, and integrated command systems. Second, China is also advancing space-enabled capabilities. As Beijing builds ISR satellites and precision-strike “kill chains,” space becomes mutually vulnerable. The same developments that help the U.S. resist Chinese attacks also limit its ability to blind China.
In conclusion, Burdette moves the space warfare debate beyond metaphor and alarmism, grounding it in operational realities. His scenario-based analysis of space dependence and resilience brings clarity to an often-hyperbolic discussion. He argues that while space will remain critical and contested, fears of collapse are overstated. What matters more is how both sides prepare for friction, degradation, and adaptation—offering a more realistic and policy-relevant vision of the U.S.-China military balance in space.