India’s civilian nuclear programme has long been tightly controlled by the state. Under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, nuclear power was a government monopoly—the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and its agencies (such as NPCIL) handled all reactor construction, fuel fabrication, and exploration. This “state-centric” model kept strategic nuclear activities under exclusive control, but also curtailed capacity growth and technology diversification. By contrast, countries such as the United States (∼100 GW) and France (∼65 GW) had, decades earlier, embraced more private participation and ownership in nuclear energy.
In 2010, the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) introduced a civil liability regime for accidents, making the operator (e.g. NPCIL) strictly liable for damages up to a fixed cap of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). That law also allowed the operator recourse against suppliers only if explicitly provided for in contract, which proved a major stumbling block for foreign vendors (Westinghouse, EDF, etc.), fearing open-ended future liability. As several analyses have noted, CLNDA’s “right of recourse” clause became a disincentive to investment, since equipment makers could be sued for nuclear incidents.
By 2025, India’s nuclear share remained modest, just 3.1% of total power generation, spread across 24 reactors with a combined capacity of about 8.8 GW. According to a written reply in the Rajya Sabha, the Union Minister of State for the Department of Atomic Energy stated that 21 reactors with a total capacity of 15,300 MW are currently at various stages of implementation by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL). Of these, nine reactors with a total capacity of 7,300 MW, including the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) being implemented by Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidhyut Nigam Limited (BHAVINI), are under construction, while twelve reactors with a capacity of 8,000 MW, including two 500 MW twin-unit Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) by BHAVINI, are at the pre-project stage.
At the same time, as part of its long-term carbon-neutrality roadmap (net-zero by 2070), India has set an ambitious target of achieving 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047. Realising this objective would necessitate both a revamped legal framework and large-scale capacity expansion. This is the agenda the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill, 2025, seeks to advance.
What Are the Distinct Features of the SHANTI Bill?
The SHANTI Bill represents a comprehensive reset of India’s nuclear governance by repealing both the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010. It establishes a unified regulatory framework aimed at liberalising nuclear energy.
Section 3(1) of the Bill significantly widens eligibility by allowing private companies and joint ventures beyond government entities to seek licences for nuclear projects. Though subject to licensing and safety authorisations, private players may now participate across much of the nuclear value chain, including reactor construction, operation, and fuel fabrication. Strategic activities, however, remain ring-fenced: Section 3(5) reserves enrichment, isotopic separation, spent fuel management, and high-level waste reprocessing exclusively for the Central Government, preserving state control over the sensitive fuel cycle.
The Bill introduces a dual-permit structure. A licence from the Central Government is required for undertaking nuclear facilities or activities, while a separate safety authorisation from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is mandatory for activities involving radiation exposure. This separation strengthens both operational oversight and radiation safety.
Section 9(1) liberalises research and innovation, allowing R&D in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without prior licensing, except in reserved areas. This explicitly supports domestic innovation and links nuclear expansion to emerging needs such as artificial intelligence, high-performance computing, and round-the-clock clean power.
Institutionally, the Bill grants statutory independence to the AERB (Section 17), safeguards its financial autonomy, and establishes new dispute-resolution mechanisms, including an Atomic Energy Redressal Advisory Council and specialised appellate oversight. It also creates a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission to handle accident compensation.
The liability framework remains no-fault but is streamlined. Operators bear strict liability (Section 11), subject to capped limits based on reactor size, with the Central Government covering damages beyond those caps. Mandatory insurance is required for operators, while supplier liability is limited to explicitly contractual terms or cases of wilful misconduct (Section 16), addressing earlier investor concerns. The Bill also explicitly aligns India with the IAEA’s Convention on Supplementary Compensation, reinforcing global integration.
Furthermore, enabling private investment is expected to attract foreign capital and expertise. For instance, analysts foresee US companies leveraging the reforms to expand investment, potentially linking the Bill’s passage to broader trade and investment ties. Governments in France, Russia, and Japan are also pursuing new nuclear ventures in India, and the Bill’s clarity on licences and liability could expedite cross-border projects. The government has indicated that attracting “global technology suppliers” remains a priority.
On the policy front, the Bill dovetails with India’s commitments under the Paris Agreement, including targets for “decarbonisation by 2070” and 100 GW nuclear by 2047.
What Are the Implications for AI, Clean Energy, and Net-Zero Goals?
The Bill explicitly links nuclear power to India’s future technologies and climate targets. For India’s climate goals, nuclear energy is expected to play a much larger role. Analysts estimate that India needs roughly 1,800 GW of total power by 2070, of which around 200 GW would need to come from nuclear sources. Achieving even the interim target of 100 GW by 2047 would require a multi-fold scale-up from the current level of 8.8 GW.
The legislation also aligns with India’s push toward next-generation reactors. A major focus is support for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)—compact reactors ideal for flexible, grid-scalable deployment. The government has launched a Nuclear Energy Mission allocating ₹20,000 crore to develop at least five indigenous SMR designs by 2033. The Bill’s liberal R&D provisions (Section 9) and creation of opportunity for private participation allow Indian firms to lead SMR projects, potentially leapfrogging older large-reactor technology. By fostering SMRs, SHANTI aims to keep nuclear “a commercially competitive option” for India’s future energy mix.
What Are the Challenges and Critiques?
Despite its reforms, the SHANTI Bill may not fully allay supplier concerns. Though it narrows the controversial “right of recourse” to explicitly contractual or malicious cases (Section 16), foreign vendors will closely watch how this is implemented. Critics also argue that operator liability caps (₹100–3000 crore) may be inadequate in a worst-case accident and rely heavily on the government’s willingness to step in through its liability fund. Whether India can sustain a viable insurance market for such high-risk exposure remains an open question.
Privatising nuclear power also intensifies demands on safety oversight. Although the Bill strengthens the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and prescribes penalties, regulatory capacity will need significant scaling up. Commercial viability poses another hurdle: nuclear projects are capital-intensive with long gestation periods, while the Bill offers no explicit revenue or tariff guarantees. Investors are therefore likely to seek long-term power purchase agreements or viability gap funding.
Land acquisition, environmental clearances, and local opposition will continue to test project timelines despite streamlined powers. Moreover, passing the law is only the first step; detailed rules, smooth transition of legacy projects, and timely licensing will determine real impact.
Ultimately, SHANTI lays a bold foundation. Its success will depend on effective governance, regulatory credibility, investor confidence, and sustained political commitment to safety and accountability.