In a speech during a Diwali reception in the UK in 2023, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar referred to the need to ‘reframe’ the India-UK relationship in order to ‘prepare a partnership for a contemporary era.’ This called for exploring ‘new convergences’ and fulfilling ‘unrealised potential’ in the bilateral relationship. Jaishankar’s comments alluded to the relationship resting on the laurels of longstanding bonds of a common language and legal system and the ‘living bridge’ of diaspora linkages while progress remained limited in other areas, such as technology, defence, education and the energy transition. In doing so, the UK had fallen down the list of priority countries for New Delhi.
In this context, Dr Jaishankar’s visit to the UK last week can be seen as an attempt to foster these ‘new convergences.’ Following elections in both countries last year, there has been renewed momentum in the bilateral relationship. The Labour government of Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer signalled a reprioritisation of relations with New Delhi with British Foreign Secretary David Lammy visiting India within his first month in office. The establishment of an India-UK Technology Security Initiative (TSI) and Southampton University establishing a campus in India –the first UK university to do so – shows efforts to develop a more multi-dimensional relationship. Even the announcement that the UK was handing back sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius has implications for India as the dominant resident Indian Ocean power, as reflected in this week’s visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Mauritius. Undergirding this is a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that builds on the earlier 2030 roadmap that was unveiled under the previous Conservative government. Jaishankar’s four-day visit also entailed the opening of two new Indian consulates in Belfast and Manchester (supplementing existing consulates in Birmingham and Edinburgh, as well as the embassy in London), which will help to strengthen people-to-people contact between both countries.
‘Nuclear deal’ moment
The crowning achievement of the bilateral relationship is the push towards concluding a bilateral free trade agreement. Negotiations resumed in February after stalling in 2024 as both countries went into election mode. Consensus has reportedly been reached on most of the 26 chapters with some outstanding issues moved outside the FTA negotiations, such as questions over visa and mobility rules for skilled Indian professionals and a separate social security treaty to address UK National Insurance contributions made by Indian workers on intra-company transfers.
Beyond the minutia of the FTA, the agreement symbolises a deepening of the relationship. Just as the India-US nuclear agreement was about more than civil nuclear cooperation between New Delhi and Washington, so the India-UK FTA is about more than trade between both countries. As Dr Jaishankar noted in his remarks at Chatham House last week, the FTA will have a ‘larger relationship impact’ beyond the ‘economic and trade impact’ to the broader contours of the bilateral relationship. The deal is strategically important to both countries. For the UK, the FTA would represent the most significant trade deal since the Brexit referendum in 2016. The FTA is arguably less important for India as it seeks to conclude trade deals with more significant trade partners, including the European Union and United States. Nonetheless, India is a leading source of foreign investment into the UK and Indian exports to the UK are six times that of Russia – a country that New Delhi sees as a key strategic partner.
Overcoming the ‘hesitations of history’
However, despite the strong political will on both sides to strengthen engagement, bilateral relations remain vulnerable to broader developments rooted in both countries’ pasts, present and futures. As Jaishankar notes in his book, Why Bharat Matters: ‘More than any other relationship, India’s ties with the UK carry the burden of a complex past,’ adding that ‘while refreshing their ties, India and the UK cannot ignore the issues carried forward from their history.’
The legacy of British colonial rule in India is well-known.’ However, this history continues to expose fissures in contemporary debates about the bilateral relationship. Whether it be the BJP manifesto calling for ‘bringing back Bhartiya artefacts’ as one of its foreign policy priorities, or Indian sensitivities about political and media debates in the UK about the state of Indian democracy, history continues to cast a shadow over the bilateral relationship.
On the present, opportunities and challenges arise from the large Indian diaspora community in the UK. The Indian diaspora has been a source of strength in India’s foreign policy outreach, as noted by the warm welcome that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has received from overseas Indian communities in various countries, including an event at London’s Wembley Stadium during Modi’s visit to the UK in 2015. India maintains the world’s largest diaspora, which includes several ethnic Indians that have risen to prominent positions in government, civil society and the private sector, including former British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.
As India continues its rise as a major global power while the UK settles into the position of a quintessential ‘middle power,’ there is a need to tie the bilateral relationship to their broader foreign policy priorities
However, the flip side to this narrative is elements of the diaspora engaging in behaviour that challenge India’s status and sovereignty. In this case, the so-called ‘living bridge’ can become a liability for India’s foreign relations. The most notable example of this is the Canada-India relationship, where support by members of the Sikh-Canadian community for the Khalistan separatist movement in India have soured relations between New Delhi and Ottawa. Exacerbating this is the growing electoral influence of these communities in the politics of their adopted countries. While this risk is more pronounced in Canada, it also poses latent risks to the India-UK relationship. As Jaishankar has noted, ‘British politics is often driven by vote-bank considerations, though not to the extreme extent of Canada. And this has given space for secessionist forces targeting India to operate from its soil and misuse its freedoms’.
The UK’s Labour Party is still seeking to dispel claims of an entrenched anti-India bias. This became apparent in 2019 when the party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn passed a motion calling for ‘international intervention’ on Kashmir. While Westminster has managed to de-hyphenate its relations with India and Pakistan, it remains an issue lurking in the background given the sizable Indian and Pakistani diaspora population in the UK, numbering 1.9 million and 1.6 million, respectively. This issue remained relevant during Jaishankar’s visit last week when a pro-Khalistani protestor attempted to block his vehicle and the UK parliament debated the issue of Kashmir.
All of this comes at a time when New Delhi has developed a more assertive and confident foreign policy. With New Delhi less likely to ‘turn the other cheek,’ other countries, including the UK, are learning the need to be aware of Indian sensitivities. Reflecting this, Westminster condemned the disruption to Jaishankar’s convoy after the MEA called on the UK to ‘live up to their diplomatic obligations.’ Whether this will suffice in appeasing Indian media and public opinion remains to be seen, but such issues continue to hang over the bilateral relationship.
Looking to the future, the India-UK relationship is held hostage to broader structural changes underway in the international system. This includes questions about the UK’s ability to sustain its so-called Indo-Pacific “tilt” amid fiscal constraints facing the government. Exacerbating this is the United States under President Donald Trump questioning the utility of traditional alliances while downgrading its commitment to the security of Europe. This will force the UK to prioritise the Euro-Atlantic over the Indo-Pacific, notwithstanding strategic linkages between both theatres.
At the same time, India and the UK can leverage this period of geopolitical flux to develop new convergences.
As India continues its rise as a major global power while the UK settles into the position of a quintessential ‘middle power,’ there is a need to tie their relationship to both countries’ broader foreign policy priorities. For instance, New Delhi’s proclivity to offer a more benign worldview that is non-western but not explicitly anti-western makes it a preferred partner for the UK in the Global South. Areas of potential cooperation include Digital Public Infrastructure, education and health with the UK offering financing solutions and forums such as the Commonwealth to support Indian initiatives.
Despite facing fiscal constraints, the UK maintains an ambition to remain engaged in the Indo-Pacific. The UK has enmeshed itself in several regional initiatives such as AUKUS with Australia and the US, the Global Combat Air Programme with Italy and Japan, the UK’s dialogue partnership with ASEAN and membership of the CPTPP. The India-UK relationship offers an additional avenue to sustain this engagement with cooperation in such areas as technology, climate and security, particularly in the Indian Ocean Region. This could link-up with existing regional initiatives (under a Quad-Plus framework) as the UK leverages its “special relationship” with the United States and historical bond with India to deepen its Indo-Pacific engagement.
Reflecting on the multi-dimensional nature of the India-UK relationship, Jaishankar has noted that ‘from India’s viewpoint, there are many UKs that we seek to engage simultaneously: the Global Britain, the Atlantic UK, the post-European one, the City of London, the diaspora one, the innovation and education UK, and, of course, the strategic one’. While ‘India and the UK cannot ignore the issues carried forward from their history,’ Jaishankar notes that ‘the challenge now is to make history work for the future of the relationship, where comforts and convergences overcome frictions and fissures.’ In an increasingly fluid and complex international system, maintaining this balance will remain easier said than done.
