One of the defining attributes of a great power is its ability to produce the weapons it needs for its own defence. Only a handful of nations meet this standard—the United States, Russia, and France among them. That capacity rests on an advanced industrial base and technological sophistication. A rising China has now joined their ranks. Through a deliberate strategy of defence modernisation—one of Deng Xiaoping’s “four modernisations” launched in the late 1970s—China has become a major producer of advanced weapons and a significant player in the global arms export market. Meanwhile, middle powers like South Korea and Turkey have built impressive defence industries of their own, winning clients not just in the developing world but also in Europe. India, however, has struggled to keep pace. Despite periodic bursts of ambition and some progress in recent years, it remains a laggard in the global arms production race.
At independence, India enjoyed an early advantage among non-Western states. To sustain imperial control over the subcontinent, Britain had begun to establish arms factories as early as the 18th century. The two world wars further expanded defence production in British India. Anticipating independence, Indian business houses also began to look at defence. The visionary industrialist Walchand Hirachand founded Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in 1940 and Hindustan Shipyard Ltd in 1941. But private initiative was killed by the wave of nationalisation of strategic sectors after independence.
In the 1950s, Jawaharlal Nehru unveiled plans to jointly develop a jet fighter and engine with Yugoslavia and Egypt. Those unrealistic initiatives faltered. By the 1960s, India turned to the Soviet Union for licensed production of aircraft, tanks, and other systems. But six decades of this partnership failed to generate genuine indigenous capacity. On the contrary, India slid into overwhelming dependence on Russia for its arsenal—today, roughly 60% of Indian weaponry is still of Russian origin.
By the 1970s, India’s defence production ecosystem had ossified. The private sector was kept out, and the system became state-controlled and bureaucratic attempts at reform in the 1980s and early 2000s proved fitful and uneven.
The Narendra Modi government has sought to break this inertia. Under the banner of Atmanirbhar Bharat, it has pushed to cut imports and boost local production. Defence exports have begun to grow. More importantly, private companies and start-ups have entered what was once a tightly guarded public sector preserve. A more competitive ecosystem is slowly taking shape. Yet the road to self-reliance remains long.
India invests less than 1% of its GDP in research and development, far behind not just the great powers but also emerging producers like South Korea. Defence procurement remains plagued by rigidity and delays. The “lowest bidder” principle often leads to endless litigation, protracted timelines, and the induction of systems that are outdated by the time they enter service. Despite its vast market, India has failed to leverage purchasing power to drive transformation in the defence sector. Emergency imports continue to fill critical gaps, exposing the fragility of the system.
Delhi recognises the problem. But reforms have been halting, incremental, and hesitant. To build a world-class defence industrial base, India must overhaul procurement, dramatically raise investment in research and development, and create space for innovation by the private sector. The test is not merely about reducing imports or generating exports—it is about developing the capacity to equip the armed forces with the best possible systems in real time.
The longer Delhi delays, the steeper the price. China is rapidly racing ahead, and other middle powers are turning defence production into a source of global influence. Unless India modernises faster and deeper, its ability to cope with mounting security challenges will remain severely constrained.