Relations between Russia and the United States under the Donald Trump administration have undergone a quick evolution if not a revolution. They initiated negotiations on Ukraine and agreed to restore diplomatic and economic ties. Assuring nuclear strategic stability and decreasing risks of nuclear escalation are among the objectives of renewed contacts, although they are contingent on progress on the Ukrainian track.
In the history of arms control linkages between nuclear deals and political differences have ruined already-reached agreements more than once. In 1979 the US Senate refused to ratify the signed SALT-II Treaty because the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan.
Since the conflict in Crimea in 2014 the US and Russia have practically deconstructed the system of arms control between them by withdrawing from (or suspending participation in) the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Open Skies Treaty and the New START Treaty. As a result of the general worsening of Russia-West relations, the risk of nuclear war in Europe increased in the 2020s. Responding to this Russia undertook a renewal of its nuclear doctrine just prior to the return of the Trump administration.
Every US administration produces a Nuclear Posture Review. Trump’s nuclear policy is expected to be quite different from Joe Biden’s, at least with regard to the distribution of defence responsibilities with European allies and taking into consideration the growth of the Chinese nuclear arsenal. An important factor influencing the formation of US nuclear policy is also the recent change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine.
The Evolution of Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine
Russian nuclear doctrinal principles, like the US’, originate from the Soviet-American arms race during the Cold War. During those decades they fluctuated between concepts of massive retaliation, mutual deterrence, limited nuclear war, launch-on-warning, nuclear umbrella and so on. From 1982 to 1993 the Russian nuclear doctrine also included promises of No First Use, and from 1993 till the end of the 1990s the Russian President announced the policy of “nuclear non-targeting.” Russia withdrew its obligation of No First Use in 1993 because the US and other Western nuclear powers did not extend such a promise.
The current Russian nuclear doctrine is elaborated in the latest edition of the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2014) and in the document “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” (2020, 2024).
