The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) recent report, Mapping India–Pakistan Military Power, arrives at a crucial moment—just weeks after the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, and India’s retaliatory military action under ‘Operation Sindoor’. Co-authored by Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Linus Cohen, the report offers a broad assessment of the military capabilities of South Asia’s two long-standing nuclear rivals. It serves both as a comparative analysis of hard power and a timely warning about a shifting strategic landscape.
Highlighting a sharp disparity in conventional military capabilities between India and Pakistan, the report systematically categorises the two nations’ strengths across land, sea, air, and nuclear forces. It maintains academic neutrality and intellectual rigour by relying on data from globally respected sources such as SIPRI, IISS, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. The findings clearly show India’s dominance in troop numbers, airpower, naval assets, and missile systems. However, the report also points to Pakistan’s evolving defence posture, particularly in the naval and nuclear domains.
While India holds the upper hand in conventional terms, the military equation becomes far more volatile when factoring in Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons and its growing military cooperation with China. The recent escalation has further clarified this emerging reality. Pakistan not only benefits from Chinese arms and ammunition, but also from access to advanced military technologies that enable real-time coordination of aerial and ground offensives.
The report underscores that the real challenge for India is not Pakistan in isolation, but the deepening China–Pakistan military nexus. During the recent flare-up, Pakistan employed Chinese-made drones, fighter jets, and radar systems, indicating a growing operational synergy between India’s two belligerent neighbours. This partnership raises the disturbing possibility that any future conflict between India and Pakistan could be exploited by China through simultaneous pressure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In such a scenario, India’s military resources risk being overstretched, making it harder to maintain its conventional superiority.
By mapping India’s and Pakistan’s military capabilities in the context of escalating hostilities, the report affirms that the two-front war scenario, often seen as a hypothetical situation, is becoming a real and urgent concern. India’s military planners and policymakers can no longer afford to treat the Chinese and Pakistani fronts as separate theatres of engagement. Even though India enjoys a clear conventional advantage over Pakistan, that edge is significantly diluted when Beijing enters the equation.
In short, the ASPI report is more than a strategic snapshot—it is a warning. It urges India not only to maintain its edge over Pakistan but also to accelerate joint-force readiness, modernisation, and regional diplomacy in anticipation of a possible two-front conflict. The message is unambiguous: India can no longer afford to prepare for one war at a time.
