The main thrust of Srinath Raghavan’s latest book, Indira Gandhi and the Years that Transformed India, is that Indira Gandhi’s tenure can be best explained in the wider context of structural crises, global economic shocks, and domestic political realignments. It is neither a conventional political biography of India’s first, and so far only, female Prime Minister, nor a chronological history of India from 1966 to 1984.
‘The long 1970s’, as Raghavan terms this period, transformed the Indian state substantially, and Indira Gandhi’s Caesarist style of politics was at the heart of this transformation. In his account, her Caesarism entailed an unprecedented centralisation of power in the Prime Minister’s Office, undermining the institutions of the political party, the parliament, and the judiciary; and most importantly, forging a direct, unmediated connection with the people.
Consisting of 10 chapters along with a prologue and an epilogue, the narrative style is lucid, measured, and largely free of polemic. Raghavan draws extensively on newly available government records and personal papers of key advisors such as P.N. Haksar, T.N. Kaul, and B.K. Nehru.
Raghavan’s treatment of the Emergency (1975–77) is particularly noteworthy for its layered analysis. The Emergency, he argues, was a “coup d’état” – an audacious, extra-legal seizure of power disguised in constitutional garb. Rather than treating the Emergency as a sudden aberration, Raghavan explains it through the lens of “structure, conjuncture, and event” by linking the global economic downturn, the oil shocks, the student movements in Gujarat and Bihar, and the rise of opposition leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan. This multi-level analysis reveals why the Emergency unfolded as it did and why it initially garnered public acquiescence.
The economic dimensions of Indira Gandhi’s tenure receive equally careful attention. Discussion includes her initial flirtation with liberalisation under the World Bank that led to devaluation of the rupee in her first year as Prime Minister; her turn toward dirigisme and nationalisation; and finally, her grudging embrace of pro-business policies and economic deregulation in the 1980s. He calls the nationalisation of private banks in 1969 the most significant economic decision in independent India’s history that enabled the state to “syringe resources out of the society and to pursue policies aimed at securing the society”. While Raghavan offers a rich account of Indira Gandhi’s domestic politics and institutional transformations, his treatment of her foreign policy beyond the Bangladesh War is notably thin. Key moments like her leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement and the 1974 nuclear test receive scant attention, leaving a missed opportunity to explore how her external strategy intersected with her domestic political project. Despite these minor omissions, Raghavan’s work stands out as among the most intellectually serious and original studies of Indira Gandhi’s rule to date.