In the policy brief India Must Architect Sectoral Plurilateral Blocs to Overcome Geopolitical Coercion, published by the Takshashila Institution in January 2026, authors—Lokendra Sharma, Abhishek Kadiyala, Arindam Goswami, Ashwin Prasad, and Nitin Pai argue that India’s long-standing strategy of balancing among major powers is becoming less effective. A more coercive global environment, shaped by a volatile United States, a structurally adversarial China, and a constrained Russia, has reduced India’s strategic flexibility. Dependence on any single power for technology, finance, or supply chains, the authors contend, now carries clear sovereignty risks.
The brief calls for a move away from broad, loosely structured multilateral forums towards narrowly focused, sector-specific partnerships with middle powers. These “sectoral plurilateral blocs” are intended to be small, capability-driven groupings that prioritise delivery over symbolism. By excluding major powers during their formative phase, the blocs would allow members to build trust, institutions, and shared standards on their own terms, creating buffers against external economic and political pressure. The authors recommend starting with three pilot blocs where India already has scale and experience: space cooperation, digital public infrastructure, and artificial intelligence. In each case, the focus is on shared ownership of assets, interoperable systems, and joint standard-setting rather than coordination alone. These pilots are meant to show how deep functional cooperation can create interdependence that is difficult to reverse and therefore strategically valuable.
Beyond the pilot phase, the brief outlines additional blocs covering supply chains, finance, security, social and humanitarian cooperation, and science and technology. Proposals range from electric vehicle and battery supply chains in Asia and alternative cross-border payment systems to focused counter-terrorism cooperation, regional disaster relief and public health arrangements, and shared biotechnology frameworks. Across sectors, the emphasis remains on concrete projects, binding commitments, and institutions with real authority.
The brief concludes that strategic autonomy can no longer rest on hedging alone. It must be built into the structure of India’s external partnerships. Sectoral plurilateralism, the authors argue, offers a way for India to remain outward-looking while reducing vulnerability to coercion. Over time, such arrangements could evolve from technical cooperation into sources of geopolitical leverage, allowing India and its partners to shape rules and secure critical capabilities without being drawn into rigid alignments.