In a research report titled Guns and Oil: Continuity and Change in Russia-India Relations, published by Center for Strategic and International Studies (2025) and authored by Tina Dolbaia, Vasabjit Banerjee, and Amanda Southfield, the authors examine the trajectory of Russia-India relations against the backdrop of the Ukraine war, Moscow’s strategic realignment with Beijing, and New Delhi’s quest for strategic autonomy. The report highlights how defence and energy ties continue to anchor the partnership, even as India diversifies its external engagements with the United States and other Western powers.
Historically, Russia has been India’s most consistent strategic partner since the Cold War, when Soviet economic planning and defence supplies shaped Indian policy choices. The 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation marked the apex of the Indo-Soviet relationship, as Moscow firmly supported India during its war with Pakistan. In subsequent decades, Russia emerged as India’s primary defence supplier, offering concessional financing and licensed production arrangements that Western states were unwilling to provide. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow retained importance through arms sales and energy cooperation, while strong societal ties sustained a favourable perception of Russia among Indian elites and the public.
The report stresses, however, that India’s dependence on Russian military platforms has become increasingly problematic. While Russian equipment—from MiG fighter jets to submarines and T-series tanks remains central to India’s arsenal, performance concerns arising from the Ukraine conflict and persistent delivery delays have undermined confidence in Moscow. Beginning in the 2000s, India expanded its procurement from Western states, most notably acquiring French Rafale fighters and German-designed submarines, while also deepening technology-sharing with the United States through joint exercises and the Quad framework. Nevertheless, critical systems such as the S-400 air defence platforms continue to bind India to Russia, demonstrating the difficulty of rapidly reducing reliance on a legacy supplier.
Energy relations, by contrast, illustrate India’s pragmatism. Before 2022, Russian oil accounted for only a marginal share of Indian imports. Yet Western sanctions on Moscow and ongoing conflicts, prompted New Delhi to become one of the largest buyers of discounted Russian crude, with purchases soaring to nearly 40 percent of its imports by 2023. This shift benefited domestic refiners such as Reliance Industries and Nayara Energy, who profited from processing cheaper Russian crude and re-exporting refined products, including to Europe. The authors note, however, that these gains are tempered by risks, as new EU bans on refined oil products and U.S. tariffs on Indian exports threaten the durability of the trade.
The report concludes that Russia-India relations today are characterised by both continuity and change. Defence cooperation, once unshakable, is gradually giving way to diversification and indigenisation. Energy ties, though lucrative, remain vulnerable to external sanctions regimes and shifting global markets. Other areas, such as fertilisers and nuclear energy, provide additional layers of engagement but do not fundamentally alter the balance. For New Delhi, the partnership with Moscow reflects a balancing act: maintaining a vital relationship rooted in history while steadily broadening its external options. Ultimately, the sustainability of this approach will depend on the trajectory of the Ukraine war, Russia’s growing ties with China, and India’s own ambition to consolidate its role as an autonomous global power.