In a press conference on 15 July in Washington, D.C., NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte urged countries like India, China, and Brazil — three of the BRICS grouping’s eponymous members — to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin into engaging in peace talks on Ukraine or face secondary sanctions to the tune of 100% for their continued business, particularly oil trade, with Russia.
Rutte’s warning came a day after his meeting with US President Donald Trump, where the latter threatened to impose “biting” tariffs and secondary tariffs if the Russian President failed to arrive at a peace deal within the 50-day ultimatum announced by the US. (President Trump has since shortened the deadline to 10-12 days to increase pressure on Moscow, citing a lack of progress so far).
While India’s External Affairs Ministry and the Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas responded promptly, the NATO chief’s threats raise important questions: How large is India’s dependence on Russian oil? What would happen if these sanctions were to kick in? And where do other countries, particularly European states and NATO members, stand in their energy procurement from Russia? Addressing these questions and understanding the logic and gravity of these threatened sanctions, this explainer dives into the composition of Russia’s fossil fuel exports in the nearly three-and-a-half years since the start of its war in Ukraine.
NATO chief’s remarks and India’s response
Addressing the press conference, NATO chief Rutte presented the consensus on secondary tariffs as one of the two highlights of his meeting with President Trump. The first important outcome of their meeting was the US decision to supply Ukraine with weapons, to be paid for by European countries. The second development, he added, was President Trump making it known that if Russia does not seriously engage in peace talks, then countries like India, China, and Brazil will face secondary sanctions for continuing to purchase Russian oil and gas and sometimes even reselling it for “a higher price.”
In response to Rutte’s warning, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in its weekly briefing the next day, underlined that “securing the energy needs of our people is understandably an overriding priority for us.” “In this endeavour, we are guided by what is there on offer in the markets, as also by the prevailing global circumstances. We would particularly caution against any double standards on the matter,” the official spokesperson for the MEA added.
This was in line with the Ministry’s position over the years in response to criticism over India’s procurement of Russian crude, where it has maintained that India buys oil from whoever offers the best price in the market.
India’s oil trade with Russia before and after Feb 2022: A snapshot
A net importer of crude, India relies on imports to meet nearly 88% of its crude oil needs, making it the world’s third-biggest oil importer and consumer. While the percentage has hovered around this number, the composition of India’s oil import basket has changed significantly since the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022.
In the aftermath of its war in Ukraine, Western countries banned the import of seaborne crude and petroleum products from Russia. Additionally, they placed a price cap of $60 per barrel on its oil, preventing Western operators (shippers and insurers) from participating in the Russian oil trade if the oil is priced above this limit. Losing a sizeable market, Russia began offering its crude at a discount, an opportunity countries like India and China leveraged to buy affordable energy to meet growing needs at home.
Speaking for India, this has resulted in Russia going from being a marginal player in India’s oil imports (constituting less than 1% of its total oil imports before the war) to becoming its top supplier, with Russian crude making up roughly 40% of India’s oil imports now.
As Russia made its way to the top, meeting a significant chunk of India’s crude oil needs, India’s traditional suppliers in West Asia were relegated to a secondary position. In June 2025, while Russian crude accounted for 43.2% of India’s oil imports, the share of India’s traditional suppliers, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, was a meagre 18%, 12% and 10%, respectively.
India’s growing oil trade with Russia is a cause of concern for Western countries, who argue that such export revenues feed directly into Russia’s war machine and help it sustain its aggression against Ukraine. Data, however, has been unforgiving to EU and NATO members too.
Where does Europe’s oil and gas procurement from Russia stand?
A July 2025 report by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) reveals China and India as the top purchasers of Russian coal and crude since EU oil bans kicked in (December 2022) till June 2025.
However, the same report also reveals that Türkiye, a NATO member, was the third-largest buyer of Russian coal in the same period. While China purchased 44% of Russian coal exports, India purchased 19% and Türkiye 11%. When it comes to Russian crude oil in the same period, China bought 47% of all exports, followed by India (38%), and the European Union (EU) and Türkiye, at 6% each.
Meanwhile, the EU was the largest buyer of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) and pipeline gas. While the EU has moved considerably away from Russian crude, it has not sanctioned fossil fuels like LNG and pipeline gas, which means they are still legally allowed into these countries and have contributed to Russia’s fossil fuel revenues.
CREA’s analysis of the top 5 buyers of Russian fossil fuels (irrespective of the type of fossil fuel) in June 2025 shows China was the largest buyer, followed by India, Turkiye, the EU, and finally, Brazil. A large percentage of the EU’s imports of Russian fossil fuels were natural gas (pipeline gas and LNG), but Russian crude continues to flow into countries like Hungary and Slovakia under an exemption.
Another report by CREA, published in February 2025, highlighted that EU imports of Russian fossil fuels in the third year of the war exceeded the financial aid sent to Ukraine. EU members bought roughly €22bn worth of Russian fuels in 2024 but gave Kyiv around €19bn in financial assistance. “Sanctioning countries are fueling the very war that’s killing their allies in Ukraine: sending fossil fuel revenues that finance the Russian military with one hand, and financial aid to Ukraine with the other hand,” CREA quoted an analyst in its press release.
Indian External Affairs Minister highlighted the same three years ago at the GLOBSEC 2022 Bratislava Forum. When asked whether India is “funding this [Ukraine] war” because of its oil business with Russia, he called for even-handedness, saying, “Why is it only Indian money, and oil coming to India, which funds, but it’s not gas coming to Europe, which funds [the war]?”
Speaking of the EU sanctions package that had been introduced then, he said the package had been designed to take the population’s welfare into account. There were timelines in place, and Russian fossil fuel imports were to be slowly phased out. “So, if a Europe says, ‘we have to manage it in a way in which its impact on my economy is not traumatic’, that freedom…should exist for other people as well,” the Minister had said.
What lies ahead?
Besides the NATO chief’s warning, the EU recently adopted the 18th sanctions package against Russia, fixing some loopholes in its previous sanctions policies. The package involves lowering the price cap on Russian crude from $60 to $47.6 a barrel and an import ban on refined petroleum products bought from third countries but made of Russian crude. The latter comes as Europe’s attempts to curtail Russia’s oil revenue and decouple from Moscow fell short, with third countries like India and Türkiye increasing their import of Russian oil and selling it to Europe as refined oil products. This meant Europe also indirectly contributed to Moscow’s revenues, a loophole the latest sanctions address.
However, expert opinion is that Russia can find ways around the latest sanctions as well, while countries like India and China will continue buying cheaper oil from Russia and can re-route their fuel exports, earlier destined for Europe, to other countries.
Given the limited effectiveness of US and EU sanctions and President Trump’s thinning patience over the Ukraine war, the secondary tariffs he and Rutte threatened to impose appear as a viable option to force Moscow’s hand. But will Trump act on these tariffs?
It is in the interest of the US and the global economy to ensure oil prices remain stable. If Russian crude becomes inaccessible due to secondary sanctions, oil prices will likely witness a sharp rise due to reduced supply in the global market, a scenario all actors want to avoid. This is why Moscow, Indian refineries, and the oil market at large have taken the news of secondary sanctions calmly thus far.