Dr Debashis Nath, in Continuities and Changes in India’s Approach to Regional Cooperation – a Three-Level Analysis (Third World Quarterly, 2025), argues that India’s cooperative strategy should not be read as a linear transition from one framework to another. Instead, India operates through “multiple, simultaneous layers” (p.1) of cooperation shaped by changing constraints in its regional and global environment. He conceptualises this approach across three interacting levels: global institutionalism at the top, regionalism at the middle, and sub-regionalism at the bottom.
Nath situates this framework historically by tracing India’s shift from Nehruvian pan-Asian idealism and Non-Aligned multilateralism to South Asian regionalism centred on SAARC, and later towards sub-regional initiatives. He notes that the Sino–Indian war of 1962 undermined pan-Asian regionalism, while sustained India–Pakistan rivalry progressively paralysed SAARC. These developments compelled India to reassess its modes of cooperation. Importantly, Nath does not argue that newer approaches replaced earlier ones. Rather, he shows that India’s policy has evolved into a structure in which different levels of cooperation operate simultaneously, reflecting the persistence of colonial legacies, distrust among neighbours, and asymmetrical power relations in South Asia, which he characterises as a “region without regionalism” (p.1).
At the global level, Nath examines India’s engagement with BRICS as an expression of global institutionalism oriented towards reforming international political and financial governance. He describes BRICS as aligning with “South–South cooperation strategies for development” (p.3) and as a platform through which India sought institutional reform, including changes in IMF quota distribution and the creation of alternative development finance mechanisms. However, Nath also underlines emerging constraints. The expansion of BRICS under the BRICS+ framework, debates over de-dollarisation, and the growing China-centric character of the grouping have complicated India’s participation, raising concerns about strategic autonomy and long-term returns.
At the regional level, Nath analyses India’s transition from the Look East Policy to the Act East Policy, with ASEAN as the central arena of engagement. While acknowledging significant growth in India–ASEAN trade, he highlights persistent structural weaknesses, including widening trade deficits, limited export competitiveness, and the failure of land-based connectivity through India’s Northeast. Nath observes that although trade volumes increased, “this growth has benefitted ASEAN more than India” (p.6), exposing the uneven outcomes of India’s regional economic integration strategy.
At the sub-regional level, Nath focuses on BIMSTEC, BBIN, and the BCIM Economic Corridor as responses to SAARC’s stagnation. Sub-regionalism enabled India to bypass political deadlock and prioritise functional cooperation in connectivity, security, and development, particularly in the Bay of Bengal and the Northeast. Nath characterises BIMSTEC as part of India’s “three-in-one strategy” (p.7), combining neighbourhood-first diplomacy, Act East objectives, and Northeast development. At the same time, he identifies serious constraints arising from domestic instability in neighbouring states, bilateral tensions, infrastructure gaps, and India’s security concerns regarding China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which ultimately stalled initiatives such as BCIM.
Nath concludes that continuity in India’s approach lies in its consistent preference for flexible cooperation and strategic autonomy, while change is reflected in the multiplication of cooperative frameworks operating at different levels. India’s central challenge is not selecting one level of cooperation over another, but managing the contradictions that arise when global, regional, and sub-regional strategies function simultaneously in an increasingly unstable regional and global context.