Relations between Russia and the USA under the Trump administration are undergoing a quick evolution, if not a “revolution”. They are not only supposed to deal with Ukraine but also work to resume negotiations on other issues. These include attaining strategic stability and decreasing the risks of a nuclear escalation.
Since the Crimean conflict in 2014, the U.S. and Russia have practically deconstructed the system of arms control between them by withdrawing from (or suspending participation in) the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Open Skies Treaty and the New START Treaty. As a result of general long-term worsening of the Russia-West relations, the risk of a nuclear war in Europe increased in the 2020s even higher than it was in the times of the “classical” Cold War. Reacting to this, and just before the arrival of the Trump administration, Russia undertook symptomatic renewal of its nuclear doctrine.
Russian Nuclear Doctrine Evolution
Russian nuclear doctrinal principles largely emanate from the Soviet-American arms race during the Cold War. During the nuclear age they fluctuated between principles and concepts of “massive retaliation,” “mutual deterrence,” “limited nuclear war,” “launch-on-warning,” “nuclear umbrella” etc. From 1982 to 1993, Russian nuclear doctrine also included political promises of “No-first-use” and since 1992 till the end of the 1990s of “nuclear non-targeting.” It is notable that in 1993 Russia withdrew its obligation of No-first-use motivated by the fact that the U.S. and other nuclear powers did not extend such a promise.
Currently the open (public) Russian nuclear doctrine is documented in both the latest edition of the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2014) and in the Presidential Decree adopting the document “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” (2020, 2024).
By the early 2020s, after several revisions, the Russian nuclear doctrine was centered around the principle of mutual deterrence with the U.S., implicitly stressing the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons by others. It included references to the necessity of strategic stability, the “nuclear triad,” survivability and mobility of carriers with “launch-under-attack” (analagous to American “launch-on-warning”) strategy for the high-readiness part of the arsenal, “nuclear umbrella” for military allies, arms control as a means to limit the arms race, and other principles.
In the June 2020 document, the doctrine specified four cases (scenarios) under which Moscow may consider the use of nuclear weapons:
a) receipt of reliable information on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
b) the enemy’s use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction against the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
c) the enemy’s impact on critically important state or military facilities of the Russian Federation, the failure of which will disrupt the response by nuclear forces;
d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the State is threatened.
Notably, the doctrine supposed a possibility to use nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear attack, but as well to the use of chemical, biological, radiological weapons or massive conventional attacks by the adversary. “Nuclear umbrella” for the allies was normally provided to non-Russian members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.
The formulation “when the very existence of the State is threatened” meant quite a high threshold, postponing consideration of a nuclear use to the situation of the “last resort.” Obviously, the situations when the existence of a state is at stake happen much more rarely than challenges from low- and mid-intensity conflicts and wars.
Recent Amendments
In 2024, the text and principles of the Russian nuclear doctrine were amended. The goals and subjects for nuclear deterrence were widened. In the context of the Ukraine conflict, amid extensive assistance to Ukraine from the West the nuclear field was used for signaling by Russia to the nuclear and non-nuclear (including Ukraine) states that the risk of nuclear confrontation should deter them from certain steps not only in the nuclear area, but also in conventional warfare and general political actions. The first public references to a forthcoming change in the nuclear doctrine coincided with the moment when the U.S., German, British, French and other Western governments were considering providing the Ukraine with longer-range missiles and deciding to permit using them against deep targets in Russian territory (including reaching Moscow). In this respect, nuclear deterrence was designated to serve as a means of political containment.
If nuclear deterrence was previously interpreted as directed only against nuclear states, now a new provision was added: nuclear deterrence is also exercised in relation to states (non-nuclear as well) that provide their territory and resources for the preparing and implementing aggression against the Russian Federation.
Efforts by Ukraine and the U.S., UK and France (as key NATO states) to impose a “strategic defeat” was countered by the new definition that “aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.”
This provision has an immediate effect because such direct “support” and indirect “participation” (via providing military advisors, training, supply of weapons) in the case of conflict in Ukraine has and is already in place. But notably, the Trump administration in early 2025 cut military support to Ukraine, even the provision of reconnaissance and satellite-supported targeting data. That at least temporarily may exclude the U.S. from the Russian definition of “joint aggression.” The task of “strategic defeat of Russia” disappeared from U.S. official rhetoric under Trump, and even the more hawkish EU leaders started to talk not of “imposing strategic defeat of Russia” but of “avoiding the defeat of Ukraine.”
Redefining nuclear umbrella
The very configuration of Russia’s “nuclear umbrella” has since changed.
Belarus got a specific political promise that is not extended to other allies – of a potential nuclear response from Russia against those who undertake a massive conventional attack on Belarus. That promise was linked to the concrete circumstances of relocating a part of the Russian tactical NW arsenal to the territory of Belarus, as well as threats from Ukraine to undertake military assaults against Belarussian territory.
It is a matter of interpretation, but the combination of a renewed doctrine and the new (2024) Treaty between Russia and North Korea on strategic military partnership may extend the Russian “nuclear umbrella” in some circumstances to the DPRK as a “new old strategic ally.”
The main changes in the principles and text of the Russian nuclear doctrine occur in the part defining circumstances (scenarios) when Moscow may consider the actual use of nuclear weapons. Reference to the last resort circumstances when “the very existence of the State is endangered” is changed to a formula “aggression… creating a critical threat to the sovereignty and/or territorial integrity [of Russia and Belarus].” That change is interpreted by many commentators as lowering the threshold for nuclear use. The new formulation in the Russian doctrine makes a nuclear use threshold lower than in previous versions but it is still higher than in the 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (“when the vital interests of the USA, their allies and partners are endangered”), taking into consideration that the national interests of the USA are projected far beyond its national borders.
Priorities for a Nuclear Dialogue
Irrespective of Western accusations that Russia blackmails Ukraine, Moscow’s nuclear phraseology has in fact remained quite responsible and addressed mainly not to Ukraine, but to Western capitals motivating them not to engage deeper in the conflict.
There are several possible priorities for reopening the U.S.-Russian nuclear dialogue that became feasible under the Trump administration’s new orientations.
The U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue is likely to resume at some point. Such a dialogue has an urgent agenda. The New Start Treaty formally finishes in February 2026. Though it seems to be too late to evolve a new framework strategic arms reduction treaty by then, both sides could quickly agree to keep strategic nuclear arsenals under the “ceilings” defined by the Treaty (not more then 700 deployed carriers and 1550 deployed warheads) until the elaboration of a new framework agreement.
Russia has lowered its threshold for nuclear use but it is still higher than what is spelled out in the 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review. There is plenty that both sides can agree on in the new bilateral climate
The urgent issue is to avoid redeployment of formerly prohibited by the INF Treaty medium range dual-use missiles in Europe. The U.S. announced under the Biden administration a deal with Germany to deploy in 2026 a new generation of such missiles on German soil, and Russia was planning to respond with a deployment of mid-range missiles able by range to reach Paris, London, Berlin or Brussels. Now, after the arrival of Trump and a new Chancellor in Berlin, there are chances to renegotiate those terms, refrain from such deployments and lower the risk of a nuclear confrontation in Europe.
America still keeps in Europe on six military bases in five countries (Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Turkey) around two hundred tactical nuclear weapons, while Russia recently moved some of its numerous tactical nukes to Belarus. Both sides may discuss and arrange parallel withdrawals of such tactical weapons (all or in part) even without formal agreement, repeating the successful experience of parallel Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) in 1991 when thousands of tactical nukes were unilaterally (based upon inter-presidential “gentlemen’s agreement”) withdrawn by each side from the European theatre.
A futuristic priority of potential Russian-American nuclear dialogue is to discuss measures and guarantees preventing accidental or unintentional nuclear war because of malfunctioning of an Artificial Intelligence that would be (already is!) involved in command and control of nuclear weapons and early warning systems. The risks of technological/human mistakes are also a motivation to reconsider the application of “launch-on-warning” strategies in conditions when missiles flight time are shortening to several minutes, dramatically cutting time for early warning and decision-making.
The list of priorities for the long-awaited risk reduction U.S.-Russian dialogue is long, and the window of opportunity opened by the new tone of interaction can close at some point. Both sides need to rush to achieve at least some practical results that can have a significant impact on the security of the whole international system.
