Relations between Russia and the USA under the Trump administration are undergoing a quick evolution, if not a “revolution”. They are not only supposed to deal with Ukraine but also work to resume negotiations on other issues. These include attaining strategic stability and decreasing the risks of a nuclear escalation.
Since the Crimean conflict in 2014, the U.S. and Russia have practically deconstructed the system of arms control between them by withdrawing from (or suspending participation in) the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Open Skies Treaty and the New START Treaty. As a result of general long-term worsening of the Russia-West relations, the risk of a nuclear war in Europe increased in the 2020s even higher than it was in the times of the “classical” Cold War. Reacting to this, and just before the arrival of the Trump administration, Russia undertook symptomatic renewal of its nuclear doctrine.
Russian Nuclear Doctrine Evolution
Russian nuclear doctrinal principles largely emanate from the Soviet-American arms race during the Cold War. During the nuclear age they fluctuated between principles and concepts of “massive retaliation,” “mutual deterrence,” “limited nuclear war,” “launch-on-warning,” “nuclear umbrella” etc. From 1982 to 1993, Russian nuclear doctrine also included political promises of “No-first-use” and since 1992 till the end of the 1990s of “nuclear non-targeting.” It is notable that in 1993 Russia withdrew its obligation of No-first-use motivated by the fact that the U.S. and other nuclear powers did not extend such a promise.
Currently the open (public) Russian nuclear doctrine is documented in both the latest edition of the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2014) and in the Presidential Decree adopting the document “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” (2020, 2024).
