In a research report titled The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor: Connectivity in an Era of Geopolitical Uncertainty, published by the Atlantic Council (2025) and authored by Afaq Hussain and Nicholas Shafer, the authors examine the IMEC as both an economic and geopolitical project. They argue that the corridor is more than a transport link: it represents a strategic platform where infrastructure, energy, and digital networks become tools of statecraft in a time of contested connectivity and shifting power balances.
The report traces IMEC’s origins to the G20 New Delhi Summit of 2023, where India, the US, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE announced plans for a 6,400-kilometre multimodal corridor linking Indian ports to the Gulf and on to Europe through rail, maritime, and energy routes. By placing IMEC alongside the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and other connectivity schemes, the authors show how it reflects a competitive geo-economic landscape with diversification of supply chains, reduction of vulnerabilities, and projection of influence without replicating China’s debt-heavy model.
Within this framework, India is positioned as the anchor state and principal beneficiary. The Gulf partners—especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE—view IMEC as a tool to advance Vision 2030 and Vision 2031 goals, turning themselves into logistics and technology hubs. Europe is cast as an endpoint and co-designer, using IMEC to reduce dependence on Russian energy and Chinese infrastructure while revitalising engagement with the Global South. The US, though geographically outside the route, is described as an enabling power, promoting IMEC through its Indo-Pacific and Middle East policies as a positive alternative to Beijing’s initiatives.
The report also highlights obstacles to IMEC’s success. The transport framework alone has a financing gap of roughly $5 billion, mostly in Jordan and Israel. Political instability in the Middle East could disrupt construction and deter investors. Differing regulatory regimes and technology standards may create obstacles in digital and energy connectivity. Without a credible coordinating body of ministers, a permanent secretariat, technical working groups, and private-sector stakeholders together, IMEC risks remaining a patchwork of bilateral projects rather than a functioning corridor generating trade, jobs, and green-transition benefits.
The report concludes by situating IMEC within the broader debate on open, rules-based connectivity. The report notes that countries such as Greece, Egypt, and Oman are likely future entrants or observers to the corridor because of their geographic position and existing infrastructure. Their inclusion could extend IMEC’s reach into the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, but also adds complexity to coordination and financing. If the signatories act decisively, IMEC has the potential to evolve beyond a mere concept, establishing the relational and economic foundations for a new Eurasian geoeconomic and geopolitical order grounded in transparency, shared interests, and aligned strategic direction.