Idden Aryasatya and Eko Daryanto’s article in the Security Intelligence Terrorism Journal, 2025, titled “Cyber Warfare and Its Place in Modern Geopolitics and War” , explores how digital technologies are changing the way states think about security and conflict. Their central argument is clear: cyber warfare is not a distant or theoretical threat. It already shapes how countries assert power, defend sovereignty, and manage crises. Although wealthier states have poured resources into cyber capabilities, the authors argue that developing countries face a different challenge, being pushed into this new space without the right tools, policies, or protections to handle it. The article also amplifies how uneven the global response has been where they are still writing basic policy frameworks.
The article observes that as states grow more connected through smart infrastructure, digital banking, and data-driven governance, their exposure to cyber threats increases. Vulnerabilities are no longer confined to military assets or classified networks. Instead, public transport systems, hospitals, election infrastructure, and even water supply grids are now potential targets. The authors argue that as more essential services and systems move online, the number of ways they can be targeted increases, leaving societies more exposed to cyber threats, especially in countries that lack adequate cyber security investment or preparedness.
Cyber attacks, as the article outlines, take many forms. Some are silent and long-term, like data theft and surveillance. Others are more visible, such as ransomware incidents or operations that disable physical infrastructure. Aryasatya and Daryanto point to the Ukraine conflict, where suspected Russian cyber attacks cut power in winter, as a case that shows how digital warfare can be integrated with conventional tactics. They also revisit the Stuxnet (a computer worm) operation against Iran’s nuclear programme to show how a single line of code can cause real-world damage without a missile being fired.
The authors expand beyond the technical side of cyber conflict and emphasise its legal and moral ambiguity. In traditional war, there are rules, at least in theory. But in cyberspace, the boundaries are blurred. Attacks are hard to trace. There is no agreed definition of what counts as an “act of war”, and the effects of cyber operations, whether psychological, economic, or political, do not always fit neatly into existing laws. This raises hard questions: When a disinformation campaign causes unrest, who is responsible? When hospitals are hacked during conflict, is that a war crime?
The authors go further to highlight a deeper ethical dilemma. Because digital operations often occur invisibly and pre-emptively, civilian harm is not just collateral but sometimes central to strategic outcomes. Cyber attacks can amplify inequality, disrupt public services in the poorest regions, and exploit digital illiteracy. For states already burdened by fragile institutions, the line between strategic deterrence and social chaos is dangerously thin.
At the same time, the tools to carry out cyber attacks are becoming more widely available. A small group with modest resources can now disrupt government systems or financial networks. This, the authors argue, is what makes cyberspace both a great equaliser and a growing source of instability.
The article also reflects on how cyber operations fit into a wider geopolitical pattern. Cyber capabilities are increasingly tied to alliances, intelligence partnerships, and strategic influence. Countries that lack digital infrastructure are pressured into dependency on foreign technologies, which may carry hidden surveillance risks or backdoors. This leads to a second-tier cyber status that mirrors and reinforces traditional global hierarchies.
Yet Aryasatya and Daryanto do not take a purely pessimistic view. Their call is not just to recognise the dangers, but to take cyber warfare seriously within broader national security planning. This includes building legal safeguards, developing international norms, improving public awareness, and investing in homegrown cyber expertise. Ignoring these steps, they warn, risks leaving countries constantly reactive, patching holes after attacks but never building long-term resilience.
The article ends on a firm note: warfare has changed, and our institutions need to catch up. Cyber conflict is not just a support tool for traditional armies. It is becoming the first move in many modern confrontations. The authors urge policymakers, especially in the Global South, to stop treating cyber security as a technical afterthought. In their view, the future of national security depends on integrating digital defences with real-world strategy, legal clarity, and ethical oversight.
By making the case for a more serious and strategic approach to cyber warfare, Aryasatya and Daryanto deliver both a warning and a roadmap. As they make clear, the next great power contest may not begin on a battlefield. It may begin online, and we may not even know it has started until it is already underway.