Oliver P. Richmond, in his article “Peace in an Authoritarian International Order versus Peace in the Liberal International Order,” published in International Affairs (Volume 101, Issue 4, July 2025), offers a timely and critical examination of how global peace praxis is evolving amid the decline of the Liberal International Order (LIO) and the simultaneous rise of a developing Authoritarian International Order (AIO). Drawing on recent geopolitical developments, from the wars in Syria and Ukraine to the multipolar diplomacy of BRICS and contested norms within the United Nations, Richmond asks whether peacemaking remains bound to hegemonic power or whether it might emerge through more pluralist and knowledge-based approaches.
Richmond’s core argument is that the liberal peace model, which gained prominence after the Cold War and was promoted as the global standard for peace and cooperation, has weakened due to its internal contradictions. While it claimed to advance democracy, human rights and development, in practice it often prioritised Western-led stabilisation, uneven peacebuilding and the selective application of international norms. After events such as 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq War, this model became increasingly intertwined with militarised strategies and neoliberal priorities that placed order above justice. As a result, Richmond contends that the LIO lost credibility, particularly within conflict zones and among states in the global South. This decline in trust created space for the emergence of an authoritarian alternative.
In Richmond’s view, the AIO is not yet a fully established regime. Rather, it is an evolving pattern of geopolitical behaviour rooted in force, hierarchy and elite consensus rather than rights or law. It is represented by states such as Russia, China and Iran, which reject Western hegemony but do not necessarily support pluralism, justice or civil society. Instead, the AIO is built on principles such as sovereignty, non-intervention, developmentalism and transactional diplomacy. Its conflict management strategies often normalise violence, suppress dissent and reject emancipatory or transformative discourses. Conceptually, the AIO draws less from Kantian ideals of perpetual peace and more from Carl Schmitt’s realist ideas of political enmity and the sovereign exception.
This emerging order does not simply challenge the liberal model of peace. It seeks to replace it with a vision in which stability is maintained through surveillance, containment and centralised control. Richmond notes that in cases such as Syria and Libya, authoritarian actors have stepped into the void left by the retreat of liberal peacebuilding, re-legitimising regimes through militarised governance and illiberal political settlements. Even global institutions like the United Nations have become increasingly constrained by Security Council vetoes and ideological polarisation, enabling regional and authoritarian actors to advance alternative peace narratives, often rooted in repression.
Drawing on case studies, field interviews and institutional observations, Richmond identifies structural weaknesses in both liberal and authoritarian approaches. The LIO, despite its formal commitment to multilateralism and international law, is often perceived as inconsistent. It has supported authoritarian allies, used human rights selectively and advanced securitised migration policies. In post-conflict contexts such as Bosnia, Kosovo and the occupied Palestinian territories, Western-imposed conditionalities have at times strengthened nationalist or authoritarian actors. The AIO, by contrast, provides even less space for bottom-up peace processes. It marginalises civil society, strategically appropriates discourses of justice and treats peace primarily as a tool of elite control rather than social transformation.
Richmond does not present the LIO and AIO as strict opposites. Instead, he suggests that their interaction has created a space of hybrid and ambiguous peace practices. For instance, Gulf states such as Qatar and Turkey have engaged in “multi-mediation,” operating across both liberal and authoritarian domains. China’s contributions to UN peacekeeping and its developmental peace agenda through the Belt and Road Initiative, although state-led and hierarchical, have occasionally overlapped with liberal mechanisms. Nevertheless, these remain exceptions in a broader context where growing multipolar competition is replacing global cooperation, and where peace frameworks often lack a strong ethical foundation.
In conclusion, Richmond offers a normative critique. Neither the LIO nor the AIO is capable of fulfilling the main objectives of critical peace theory, such as justice, sustainability, pluralism and the protection of subaltern groups. While multipolarity may allow greater diplomatic flexibility, without a strong commitment to legal norms and human dignity it risks turning peace into a fragmented system of coercive spheres of influence. Although the AIO often uses anti-colonial rhetoric, Richmond argues that it ultimately resists democratic transformation. It borrows postcolonial language while silencing civil voices and reinforcing hierarchical power structures. Meanwhile, the LIO must reckon with its own contradictions and past failures if it is to regain normative legitimacy.
In sum, Richmond argues that contemporary peacemaking is facing a conceptual deadlock. As the global order shifts, the challenge is not merely the return of great-power rivalry. More importantly, it is the risk of normalising a system in which peace is detached from justice and sustained through coercion. For scholars and practitioners committed to inclusive and sustainable peace, the task ahead is to challenge the regressive logic of both models and to develop new post-liberal frameworks grounded in ethical practice and transnational solidarity.
