The Middle East has long feared a direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran—a fear that is now materialising amid an already volatile backdrop shaped by the 7 October Hamas attacks and the continuing war in Gaza. Iran has played a significant role through its proxies—Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen—and has already clashed directly with Israel twice in 2024. But what is unfolding now is not just another round of proxy conflict—it is a full-scale war, triggered by the decades-old dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme, distrust and struggle for regional dominance.
Israel attacked Iran on Friday, 13 June, and in four days hasn’t stopped its aerial attacks, drone bombings and internal sabotage through Mossad operatives in Iran. Israel is less successful in defending itself on the home front. The Israeli Defence Force provided its first statistics on Monday of the war on its “shoot down success”, setting it at 80–90%, with only about 5–10% of ballistic missiles hitting actual residential areas. In three nights, around 24 people lost their lives, more than 400 were wounded, and 1,000 were left homeless as a result of the direct hit of the Iranian missiles. To date, Iran has targeted central Israel, Gush Dan, Tel Aviv, Beersheba in the south and Haifa in the north. Israelis are united, a rare occurrence, behind Benjamin Netanyahu. Writing this piece from Tel Aviv, I find that the growing deaths and large-scale destruction of residential areas in Israel are becoming concerning. Iron Dome and the newly built Iron Beam systems are not iron-clad air-defence mechanisms if more than two or three missiles can touch the ground each night.
For Israel, Iran’s nuclear ambitions have represented an existential threat because of Tehran’s open negation of the State of Israel, and often calls for its destruction since 1979. It is also true that Israel doesn’t prefer a nuclear Iran that can end its, de-facto, nuclear edge in the region. For the United States and other Western powers, Iran’s nuclearisation is not acceptable purely for power equations. Iran chooses to be nuclear against Western wishes, and it should have that right, as did India under US sanctions. However, there is more to Iran and its ideological being than the fulfilment of its sovereign will.
Israel–Iran animosity obscures an older, almost forgotten history—before 1979, Israel and Iran were allies. The dramatic shift from partnership to hostility is a reminder that in international relations, ideology and leadership often matter more than geography or long-term interests.
