On January 24, 2026, China’s Ministry of National Defence announced that General Zhang Youxia and General Liu Zhenli were placed under investigation by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee for “serious disciplinary and legal violations”. Zhang’s dismissal marks only the second time since the 1966–76 Cultural Revolution that a serving general sitting on the Central Military Commission (CMC) has been removed while still in office.
General Zhang Youxia was long regarded as Xi Jinping’s closest military aide and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) most senior duty officer. As senior vice Chairman of the CMC, Zhang occupied the apex of China’s military command structure. The CMC represents the ultimate locus of power in the Chinese state, exercising command over the PLA, one of the world’s largest standing armed forces. His removal shatters the myth of immunity long associated with the Party’s top leadership.
Simultaneously, General Liu Zhenli, Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department and responsible for coordinating the PLA’s C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities, was also purged. The CMC, which is usually composed of around seven members, now has only two: Chairman Xi Jinping and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin.
What distinguishes the 2026 episode from earlier purges is the explicit shift in framing. While the removal of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou in the mid-2010s was framed as an anti-corruption measure, the 2026 cases have been justified on grounds of “serious disciplinary violations.” In his subsequent New Year address, Xi Jinping characterised the removals as “in-depth political rectification,” suggesting that the military is undergoing disciplinary consolidation and ideological alignment.
Previous Waves of Purges
In October 2025, eight senior generals were expelled from the Communist Party on corruption charges. The internal cleansing of the PLA began shortly after Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, when the administration launched a relentless anti-corruption drive that effectively dismantled the old military establishment.
In that first five-year wave, former CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong (2002 to 2012) was expelled from the Party as part of a corruption probe. Xu Caihou, also a former CMC Vice Chairman, was stripped of all his ranks for accepting bribes in exchange for promotions and transfers. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Joint Staff Chief Fang Fenghui and Political Work Director Zhang Yang were removed. Sun Zhengcai, then a Politburo member and Party Secretary of Chongqing, was likewise investigated for corruption.
The more recent phase, between 2023 and 2025, included former Defence Minister Wei Fenghe, his successor Li Shangfu, CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong, and Political Director Miao Hua.
While the label of “corruption” remains the standard legalistic instrument for these removals, the charge often functions as a catch-all for deeper political and institutional tensions. The cumulative effect is striking: what began as an anti-corruption drive has evolved into a sustained restructuring of the PLA’s senior leadership, repeatedly sweeping aside both retired and serving commanders at the core of China’s military hierarchy.
Implications for the People’s Liberation Army
The erosion of the PLA’s command hierarchy introduces significant uncertainty into its operational planning. Repeated removals at the apex of command risk disrupting institutional continuity and may undermine readiness in high-technology domains central to contemporary warfare. While such turbulence likely reduces the immediate probability of a sustained, large-scale invasion of Taiwan, it may paradoxically heighten the risk of calibrated or limited provocations.
A controlled escalation—maritime incursions, airspace probes, or grey-zone manoeuvres—could serve a dual purpose: deterring foreign actors from exploiting these visible vulnerabilities, while generating a “rally-around-the-flag” effect to reinforce the Chairman’s domestic authority during a period of internal consolidation.
Institutionally, the CMC has become increasingly concentrated in Xi Jinping’s hands as chairman. Following the 20th Party Congress, Zhang was entrusted with operational responsibilities to accelerate joint force readiness, widely interpreted as linked to a 2027 Taiwan contingency timeline. Yet joint training reforms have lagged behind the stated ambitions, and Zhang’s public articulation of modernisation priorities, emphasising sequenced development of networked and intelligent warfare capabilities, suggested a more methodical trajectory extending toward 2035.
Subtle signs of friction surfaced in Xi’s annual address to the PLA delegation, where he invited speakers from outside the CMC’s upper command structure. This deviation from established practice signalled a possible lack of confidence in senior officers’ perspectives. By early 2026, as annual training plans entered implementation alongside the 15th Five-Year Plan, disagreements appear to have shifted from bureaucratic debate to visible non-compliance.
What does it signal?
The recent purges reflect far more than a conventional anti-corruption campaign or a routine disciplinary correction. The PLA has shown no visible resistance, underscoring its institutional design as a Leninist military structurally subordinated to the CCP. Historical precedents, from Lin Biao (1971) to Xu Qinxian (1989), demonstrate that even perceived autonomy within the armed forces can prompt decisive political intervention. These episodes reaffirm the principle that the ultimate authority rests with the Party, not the commanders.
The central question in 2026 is whether the ongoing purges represent genuine institutional rectification or primarily serve to sideline those insufficiently aligned with Xi Jinping. If the removals are substantively linked to improving joint operational coordination, advancing military–civil fusion, and enhancing organisational efficiency, they may be interpreted as part of a broader modernisation agenda. But if the primary function is to eliminate alternative power centres and recalibrate elite networks around personal loyalty, the recent moves signal a deeper consolidation of political control within China’s civil-military order.