In 2014, the Ahmadnagar (Buchpora) locality of Srinagar witnessed an unusual sight: walls suddenly covered in graffiti supporting terrorist organisations. This act, apparently one of local mischief, when investigated, led to a critical piece of intelligence that culminated in a 20-hour siege and the neutralisation of Abu Huzaifa and Chhota Hafiz, two militants.
This sequence of events is often held up as a model of effective, ground-level counter-terrorism. It was, without doubt, a triumph of the ‘reactive paradigm’, as a visible threat was identified, investigated, and neutralised.
However, this very success masked a deeper systemic vulnerability. The intelligence architecture was fundamentally designed to respond to the effect—the graffiti, the visible propaganda—rather than the cause.
This vulnerability became tragically apparent in October 2025, when a wave of extremist posters appeared in Srinagar’s Naugam area. Much like the graffiti a decade earlier, the posters signalled a brewing threat. Yet, by the time they appeared, the operational network responsible for the devastating November 10 car bomb detonation near the Red Fort was already fully mature.